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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(3)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court correctly granted a 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the claims of two federal 
retirees when it held that the federal doctrine of 
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity does not require that Utah 
provide a tax exemption to federal retirees to compensate 
for a pension increase given to state retirees? 
Standard of Review: When reviewing dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6), the court accepts "the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and consider[s] them and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable 
to the plaintiff.'' St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). The 
ruling is a question of law that is given no deference and 
is reviewed under a correctness standard. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative law is set forth verbatim in Addendum 
(A) to the brief. It is: 
1 
1. 4 U.S.C. § 111; and 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a review of an order granting dismissal under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of a complaint asking for a tax 
exemption for federal retirees claiming that a 1989 pension 
increase for state retirees discriminates against federal 
retirees under the federal doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax 
Immunity. 
Course of Proceedings 
This case began when Plaintiff Richard Thompson filed a 
claim for income tax refund for 1999 and 2000 and an amended 
tax return on behalf of himself and all others similarly 
situated, claiming that a pension increase given to state 
retirees in 1989 was a violation of the federal doctrine of 
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity. (R. 74-80.) Plaintiff Paul 
Jensen filed similar documents. (R. 89-94.) These claims 
were denied by the Taxpayer Services Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission; it notified Plaintiffs of the 
opportunity to file a petition for redetermination with the 
Utah State Tax Commission to challenge the action of the 
2 
Taxpayer Services Division. (R. 81-84, 95-98.) 
Plaintiffs did not file a petition for redetermination, 
but instead filed a complaint in the district court. (R. 1-
8.) The complaint was brought pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
23 on behalf of the named plaintiffs and a proposed class. 
(R. 3.) It sought certification of a class consisting of 
all persons and estates of deceased 
persons who participated in a federal 
retirement system prior to January 1, 
1989, who have received retirement 
benefits from the Federal Government that 
were subject to the State's income Tax, 
and who paid income tax to the State in 
the years 1999 and 2000 but who failed to 
receive the rebate provided to retirees 
from the State pursuant to section 49-1-
701 of the Utah Code. 
(R. 3.) The complaint alleged that the Tax Commission had 
refused to grant refunds. (R. at f 30.) Plaintiffs sought 
a declaratory judgment and refunds on the basis that a 1989 
pension increase to state retirees discriminated against 
federal retirees pursuant to the doctrine of 
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity. (R. 5-7.) Plaintiffs also 
sought injunctive relief barring the Tax Commission from 
further taxation of the retirement benefits of federal 
retirees. (R. 7-8.) 
The Tax Commission moved to dismiss because there was 
3 
no legal basis for Plaintiffs' claims. (R. 43-50.) It also 
argued that the State Retirement Board should be joined as a 
party. (R. 50-52.) The Commission further argued that 
these claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity on two separate theories: (1) the State of Utah had 
not waived its sovereign immunity for income tax refund 
actions m state court; and, (2) Utah had not waived its 
sovereign immunity to allow for tax actions on behalf of a 
class. (R. 52-61.) Finally, it argued that Plaintiffs had 
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. (R. 62-
67.) After a hearing on this motion, the district court 
ordered joinder of the State Retirement Board and allowed it 
to "weigh in" on the pending motion. (R. 229-232.) 
Aftei hearing from the State Retirement Board, and 
allowing all parties an opportunity to address those 
arguments, the district court granted the motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on 
the basis that Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for 
which reljef could be granted. (R. 346-354.) 
In view of that ruling, the district court decided it 
"need not reach the other arguments advanced by Defendants 
in aid of their motion." (R. 353.) 
4 
Disposition Below 
The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint 
based on a holding that Plaintiffs had failed to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted because Utah's 1989 
pension increase to state retirees did not discriminate 
against federal retirees under the doctrine of 
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity. (R. 346-354.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts are contained in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. They allege that Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 
(1998) provides for a discriminatory tax rebate to state 
retirees and they requested a tax exemption for federal 
retirees. The relevant portions of the Complaint are: 
* * * 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Declaratory Judgment: Refund of Overpayment of Tax) 
* * * 
20. The Legislature of the State of Utah recognized 
the effect of the Supreme Court's ruling in Davis and 
revoked the State income tax exemption for retirement 
benefits received by retired employees of the State under 
the State's retirement system. 
21. Shortly after revoking the exemption, the 
Legislature, in a 1989 special session held soon after Davis 
was decided, enacted a rebate of somewhat less than one half 
of the income tax burden imposed on the State retirement 
5 
income of individuals who were members of the State 
Retirement System before January 1, 1989. 
* * * 
24. This rebate is codified in section 49-1-701 of the 
Utah Code and is provided by increasing by three percent 
(3%) the retirement allowance of those members of the Utah 
State Retirement System whose benefits became taxable as a 
result of the Davis decision. 
25. The Legislature failed to enact any rebate for 
individuals such as Plaintiffs and Class Members who 
participate in Federal Retirement Systems and who receive 
benefits from those systems. 
26. The retirement income of Plaintiffs and Class 
Members is therefore subject to an impermissible 
discriminatory tax--a tax that is imposed on Plaintiffs' and 
Class Members retirement income but not on the retirement 
income of certain members of the State Retirement System to 
the extent they receive a rebate. 
~k -k ~k 
31. The principal issue in this case is whether the 
Legislature's enactment of section 49-1-701 of the Utah Code 
to provide a rebate to State retirees constitutes 
discrimination prohibited by the United States Constitution 
and 4 U.S.C. § 111. This legal issue cannot be resolved in 
the State Tax Commission's administrative proceedings. 
32. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that the 
tax imposed upon them is illegal in violation of the United 
States Constitution and 4 U.S.C. § 111 and that Plaintiffs 
are entitled to a refund of the illegal tax imposed in the 
amount of the rebate granted to members of the State 
Retirement Fund but not granted to recipients of retirement 
funds from the Federal Government. 
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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Injunctive Relief) 
33. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 32 as set forth above. 
34. Plaintiffs request a permanent injunction 
enjoining Defendants from taxing the retirement benefits of 
Plaintiffs and Class Members in a discriminatory manner. 
Specifically, the State should be enjoined from taxing any 
federal retirement benefits received by Plaintiffs and Class 
Members. 
(R. 5-7.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court assumed jurisdiction over a narrow 
declaratory action bringing a facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of a pension statute. This is consistent 
with this Court's most recent decision on subject matter 
jurisdiction. Critical to accepting jurisdiction is a 
determination that there is no other possible way to avoid 
the narrow facial challenge. If this Court disagrees with 
the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, 
it should remand to address the other issues raised in the 
Commission's motion to dismiss. 
The Court should sustain the decision below dismissing 
Mr. Thompson's and Mr. Jensen's complaint seeking a tax 
exemption for federal retirees. In 1989, following the U.S. 
7 
Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 
(1989), the Utah Legislature revoked the tax exemption for 
state retirees that was alleged to violate the federal 
doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity. That 
legislative act brought Utah into compliance with federal 
law. Utah is still in full compliance with federal law 
because federal retirees and state retirees are taxed 
identically. 
The majority opinion in Davis established that a 
pension increase to state retirees does not violate 
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity. It addressed a dissenting 
opinion by pointing out that Intergovernmental Tax Immunity 
is violated when the state enacts tax laws to benefit itself 
by discriminating against the federal government; however, 
if the state were to raise pensions, Intergovernmental Tax 
Immunity would not be violated. In this case, the federal 
treasury is benefitted by Utah's revocation of the 1989 tax 
exemption to state retirees. 
The trial court reviewed challenges to legislative 
responses to Davis. One such decision relied on by the 
trial court as persuasive was Almeter v. Virginia Department 
of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir. 429 (2000), cert, refused, No. 
8 
010270, Va. (April 20, 2001), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 889, 
122 S.Ct. 202 (mem)(Oct. 1, 2001)(R. 49), a trial Court 
decision that both the United States and Virginia Supreme 
Courts have allowed to stand by refusing to exercise their 
discretionary review powers. 
The rationale that the Almeter court relied on was that 
"In Davis, both the majority and minority opinion recognized 
that a state's response to the court's holding might be . . 
. to pay extra money to state retirees to make up for what 
those retirees lost as a result of being taxed." id. at 2. 
ARGUMENT 
Jurisdictional Background 
The district court's ruling implied that it assumed 
jurisdiction over the declaratory action portion of the 
complaint. The narrow legal question presented by the 
declaratory action was whether Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701, a 
pension statute, violated the federal constitutional and 
statutory doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity on its 
face. (R. 7, 1 31.) It held on this question, that 
"Plaintiffs' claims must fail as a matter of law. . . ." 
(R. 365.) 
District Court jurisdiction on a declaratory action of 
9 
a narrow facial challenge to the constitutionality of a 
pension statute is consistent with this Court's most recent 
decision on the subject matter jurisdiction. Critical to 
accepting jurisdiction is a determination that there is no 
other possible way to avoid the narrow facial challenge. 
Nebeker holds that exhaustion is required except under 
"unusual circumstances." Nebeker v. Tax Commission, 2001 
UT 74, ff 14, 16, 34 P.3d 180; see also Brumlev v. Tax 
Comm'n, 868 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1993) (holding that district 
court had subject matter jurisdiction because threshold 
legal questions could not realistically be avoided by "any 
turn the case might have taken in the Commission"). 
This case involves two claims that have at their core a 
federal constitutional facial challenge to a state pension 
statute. As stated in their complaint, the "principal issue 
in this case is whether the Legislature's enactment of 
section 49-1-701 of the Utah Code to provide a rebate to 
State retirees constitutes discrimination prohibited by the 
United States Constitution and 4 U.S.C. § 111." (R. 7, I 
31.) This threshold constitutional question could not be 
avoided "by any turn the case may have taken at the 
commission," Brumley at 799, nor were there other claims 
10 
which may have obviated the need to address the 
constitutional question. Nebeker, 2001 UT 74, (existence of 
other than constitutional claims may obviate the need to 
address the constitutional question). 
Although the Commission challenged the jurisdiction of 
the court below and raised other defenses to Plaintiffs' 
claims going forward, see Statement of the Case above, Judge 
Nehring addressed no other aspect of the case except the 
narrow federal legal question. He stated that the court 
"need not reach the other arguments advanced by Defendants 
in aid of their motion." (R. 365.) 
The Commission does not abandon the arguments raised as 
being applicable to issues other than that addressed by the 
court's declaratory ruling. However, the court's holding 
obviated the need for a ruling on the other issues raised by 
the Commission in its motion. (R. 37-68.) The district 
court thus properly avoided addressing all issues that are 
exclusively within the original jurisdiction of the Tax 
Commission. See Brumley v. Tax Comm'n, 868 P.2d 796, 799 
(Utah 1993) (court resolved the threshold legal question, 
but did not interfere "with the core prerogatives of the 
Commission"); see also Nebeker, 2001 UT 74, 11 16-17. 
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If this Court disagrees with the district court's 
dismissal for failure to state a claim, it should remand to 
address the other issues raised in the Commission's motion 
to dismiss. These other defenses are set forth in the 
Statement of the Case section of this brief and were fully 
argued before the district court. One of the included 
defenses was whether refund claims, brought directly in the 
district court, are barred by sovereign immunity. 
Because of the complexity and reoccurring question on 
the allocation of jurisdiction between the Commission and 
the district court, the Commission urges the Court to be 
express in its opinion that it is not holding that the 
jurisdiction of the district court is broader than that 
announced in Nebeker, but is solely addressing the narrow 
issue present herein. 
Introduction on the Merits 
The Court should sustain the decision below dismissing 
Mr. Thompson's and Mr. Jensen's complaint seeking a tax 
exemption for federal retirees. The basis of their 
Complaint is a 1989 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Davis v. 
Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), that held that a state may 
not exempt the income of state retirees while taxing the 
12 
income of federal retirees because such discrimination 
violates the federal doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax 
Immunity. 
Following Davis, in 1989, the Utah Legislature revoked 
the tax exemption for state retirees. That legislative act 
brought Utah into compliance with Davis for all years 
subsequent to 1989, including the 1999 and 2000 years at 
issue in this case. This Court resolved the pre-1989 Davis 
issues with its decision in Brumley v. Tax Comm'n, 868 P.2d 
796 (Utah 1993). As a result of Davis and Brumley, Utah 
taxpayers paid tens of millions of dollars in settlement of 
income tax claims brought by federal retirees. (1993 Utah 
Laws 2nd Sp. Sess. Ch. 2, H.B. No. 8.) 
This case is an effort to undo the 1989 legislation and 
the Brumley decision that resolved Utah's Davis related 
issues. In 1989, the Legislature also increased retirement 
pay to some state retirees. Now, fourteen years later, Mr. 
Thompson and Mr. Jensen claim that the increase in 
retirement pay to state retirees, in 1989, violated the 
doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity. However, what 
they are asking the Court to do is create a tax exemption 
for them that is unavailable to state retirees or anyone 
13 
else. 
DISMISSAL WAS PROPER BECAUSE UTAH HAS IMPLEMENTED THE 
DAVIS DECISION. 
A. Davis Expressly Allows A State Pension 
Increase. 
1. Utah Complied With The Requirements Of The 
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine 
When It Revoked The Income Tax Exemption 
For State Retirees 14 Years Ago. 
Utah has already complied with Davis v. Michigan. 
Davis, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), which held that a state could 
remedy a violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111 "either by extending 
the tax exemption to retired federal employees (or to all 
retired employees), or by eliminating the exemption for 
retired state and local government employees. . . ." Davis, 
489 U.S. at 818. 
"The [Utah] legislature responded [to Davis] on 
September 19, 1989, by making state retirement income as 
well as federal retirement income taxable, effective January 
1, 1989. 1989 Utah Laws Ch. 7, 2nd Special Session." 
Brumlev v. Tax Comm'n, 868 P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1993). At 
that point, Utah had fully complied with Davis for tax years 
after 1989, including the 1999 and 2000 years in dispute 
here. This equal treatment of retirement income, regardless 
of source, remains the same today. 
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2. Davis Expressly Said That A State Could 
Raise The Compensation Of Its Retirees. 
The majority opinion in Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 
(1989), established that a pension increase to state 
retirees does not violate Intergovernmental Tax Immunity. 
The federal statute at issue in Davis provides: 
The United States consents to the taxation 
of pay or compensation for personal 
service as an officer or employee of the 
United States . . . by a duly constituted 
taxing authority having jurisdiction, if 
the taxation does not discriminate against 
the officer or employee because of the 
source of the pay or compensation. 
4 U.S.C. § 111 (1997)(emphasis added). This statute 
addresses taxation, not pensions. 
The majority in Davis expressly validated a pension 
increase due to removal of an exemption for state employees. 
It addressed a dissenting opinion by pointing out that 
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity is violated when the state 
enacts tax laws to benefit itself by discriminating against 
the federal government; however, if the state were to raise 
pensions, Intergovernmental Tax Immunity would not be 
violated: 
We also take issue with the dissent's 
assertion that Nit is peculiarly 
inappropriate to focus solely on the 
treatment of state governmental employees' 
15 
because x[t]he State may always compensate 
in pay or salary for what it assessed in 
taxes.' Post, at 1512. In order to provide 
the same after-tax benefits to all retired 
state employees by means of increased 
salaries or benefit payments instead of a 
tax exemption, the state would have to 
increase its outlays by more than the cost 
of the current tax exemption, since the 
increased payments to retirees would 
result in higher federal income tax 
payments in some circumstances. This fact 
serves to illustrate the impact on the 
federal government of the state's 
discriminatory tax exemption for state 
retirees. Taxes enacted to reduce the 
state's employment costs at the expense of 
the Federal Treasury are the type of 
discriminatory legislation the doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity is intended 
to bar. 
Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. at 815, n.4. Accordingly, a 
pension increase is compatible with the doctrine of 
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity subsequent to removal of a 
discriminatory tax exemption. Such an increase does not 
negatively impact the federal treasury, nor does it lessen 
the tax burdens of state retirees. The 1989 pension 
increase is subject to federal taxation; it enhances the 
federal treasury. 
The trial court here correctly followed the guidelines 
of Davis to conclude that there was no legal basis for 
Plaintiffs' claims. 
16 
3. The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed 
Plaintiffs' Claims Recognizing That Davis 
Anticipated A State's Ability To Increase 
Retirement Benefits. 
The lower court correctly applied Davis. Judge Nehring 
reasoned that "the Davis Court did not foreclose, and in 
fact anticipated, a state's ability to respond to the 
Court's holding by increasing benefits to its retirees." 
(R. 349.) The trial court reviewed similar challenges to 
legislative responses to Davis and found that regardless of 
the outcome, those cases recognized that principle. (Id.) 
As set forth in the previous section of this brief, that 
reasoning is expressly found in statements by the Court in 
Davis. 
One such decision relied on by the trial court as 
persuasive was Almeter v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 
53 Va. Cir. 429 (2000), cert, refused, No. 010270, Va. 
(April 20, 2001), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 889, 122 S.Ct. 202 
(mem)(Oct. 1, 2001)(R. 49), a trial Court decision that both 
the United States and Virginia Supreme Courts have allowed 
to stand by refusing to exercise their discretionary review 
powers. 
At issue in Almeter was whether Virginia had violated 
the doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity, when in 
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response to the U.S. Supreme Court's Davis decision, it 
revoked a tax exemption for state retirees and raised 
pension benefits to state retirees by 3%. The Virginia 
Court found that it had not. The rationale that the Almeter 
court relied on was that "In Davis, both the majority and 
minority opinion recognized that a state's response to the 
court's holding might be . . . to pay extra money to state 
retirees to makeup for what those retirees lost as a result 
of being taxed." Ld. at 2. The Almeter court reasoned that 
"the majority took no issue with the state's ability to 
lawfully increase the benefits paid to state retirees to 
offset the effect of the Court's holding. . . ." Icl. It 
went on to say because "the actions complained about by 
plaintiffs, even if true, are the types of actions 
specifically contemplated and condoned by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Davis, plaintiffs have failed to 
state a cause of action." Id. 
This Court should sustain the trial court's order of 
dismissal on the same basis as that in Almeter. 
18 
4. The Trial Court's Application Of Davis Is 
Consistent With The Ragsdale Decision Of 
The Oregon Supreme Court. 
Plaintiffs argue that "no state of last resort has 
reached a contrary result." (Appellants' Brief at 17.) 
However, Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348 
(Or. 1995), sustained Oregon's first post-Davis public 
employee pension increase.1 In a later decision, discussed 
below, the Oregon Supreme Court stated that it wished to 
"emphasize that our holding necessarily is confined to the 
1995 statute. We do not overrule Ragsdale or its analysis 
of the 1991 law. . . ." Vogl v. Department of Revenue, 960 
P.2d 373, 383 (Or. 1997). Accordingly, Ragsdale is still 
valid law in Oregon and did reach a contrary result. 
At issue in Ragsdale was whether Oregon's increase of 
retirement benefits payable to some state retirees violated 
4 U.S.C. § 111 and the Davis decision. The Oregon court 
held that it did not. Ragsdale, 895 P.2d at 1355. In a 
subsequent decision, the Oregon court summarized the factors 
it had relied on in Ragsdale to sustain the public employee 
pension increase: 
Plaintiff's argument also does not recognize the 
result in Almeter discussed above. 
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(1) the 1991 legislature had obeyed the 
express dictate of Davis by repealing the 
PERS [Public Employees Retirement System] 
exemption; (2) Davis and, more generally, 
the principle of intergovernmental tax 
immunity, are indifferent to the level of 
compensation a state pays to its retirees; 
(3) the 1991 PERS increase was not part of 
the system of taxation in Oregon, but, 
instead, involved the expenditure of 
retirement trust funds in the form of 
increased compensation; and (4) there was 
uno correlation, either direct or 
indirect, between state retirees' state 
tax obligations and the amount of 
increased PERS retirement benefits'' under 
the 1991 statute. 
Vogl v. Pep't of Rev., 960 P.2d 373, 376 (Oregon 1998) (this 
case is discussed in detail below). Based on these points, 
the Ragsdale court concluded that "[t]axpayers' argument 
lacks both a factual and a legal predicate." Ragsdale, 895 
P.2d at 1355. 
If this Court decides to go beyond the express language 
of Davis, the four points of reasoning relied on in Raqsdale 
support dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint. First, as set 
forth above, Utah law complies expressly with the 
requirements of the United States Supreme Court's Davis 
decision. Plaintiffs acknowledged in their Complaint that 
"The legislature of the state of Utah recognized the effect 
of the Supreme Court's ruling in Davis and revoked the state 
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income tax exemption for retirement benefits received by 
retired employees of the state under the state's retirement 
system." (Plaintiffs' Complaint at R. 5, 1 20.) 
Second, the Oregon Supreme Court's analysis that Davis 
is indifferent to the level of compensation that a state 
pays its retirees is equally applicable here. The fact that 
Utah has increased pension benefits by three percent is 
irrelevant. As pointed out by the Oregon Supreme Court in 
Ragsdale, "Davis does not hold or even intimate that a state 
is prohibited from adjusting the compensation of its 
employees, either currently or retired. . . ." Ragsdale, 
895 P.2d at 1353 n.ll. 
Third, Utah's pension increase is not part of the 
taxation system of Utah due to its source of funding, but is 
on its face a pension increase funded by contributions. It 
is likewise not part of any tax return calculation. 
Finally, Plaintiffs have cited no statutory language 
showing that there is a link between the pension benefit 
received by a state retiree and the amount of Utah State 
income taxes paid by a retiree. Indeed, the three percent 
increase is totally independent of Utah state retiree's 
state income tax liability. 
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Utah law not only satisfies each of these points 
analyzed by the Oregon court in sustaining the Oregon 
pension statute, but it does not contain the provision most 
troubling to that court. In Raqsdale, the pension increase 
would not be paid NNin any year in which the retirement 
benefits payable under the Public Employees' Retirement 
System are exempt from Oregon personal income taxation." 
Ragsdale, 895 P.2d at 1351 (quoting the Oregon pension 
statute). The Utah statute does not contain this limitation 
on the benefit. The Utah retirement benefit provides for "a 
new basis upon which any future adjustments to benefits are 
made." The plain language of the statute does not limit 
this new basis by future changes in income tax status and 
income tax laws. 
Finally, the Ragsdale court addressed a point pressed 
by Plaintiffs in this case--the timing of the pension 
increase on the heels of the Davis decision. The Oregon 
court found that timing did not matter: 
The 1991 increase in compensation is not 
transformed into a tax rebate or tax 
benefit simply because it was motivated in 
whole or in part as a response to the 
Davis decision and the consequent removal 
of the tax exemption for PERS retirement 
benefits. Moreover, it is important to 
remember that state retirees will pay 
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state and federal income taxes on any 
increased benefits they receive. 
Ragsdale, 895 P.2d at 1355. 
The reasoning of Ragsdale provides further support for 
the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims as a 
matter of law. This Court should affirm the dismissal. 
B. This Court Would Need To Exceed The Reasoning 
Of The Montana And Oregon Courts To Overturn 
The District Court. 
This Court need not go beyond the express language of 
Davis. Plaintiffs Jensen and Thompson argue that this Court 
should follow two decisions in Montana and Oregon. The 
trial court was not persuaded by those two decisions. It 
distinguished those cases "because the benefit increases 
incorporated additional provisions which made transparent 
the true and improper nature of the response — creating a tax 
rebate." (R. 349-350.) The trial court concluded that 
"Utah's statutory response to Davis is untainted by any of 
the above mentioned provisions from which one could 
reasonably conclude that the benefit increase was, in fact, 
a tax rebate." (R. 350. ) 
A discussion of the Oregon and Montana decisions is 
most meaningful against the backdrop of Utah's pension 
increase statute. 
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1. Utah's Pension Increase Is Not A Tax 
Provision. 
The Utah pension increase is not a tax provision and 
does not fall under Davis or 4 U.S.C. § 111. The important 
elements contained in the plain language of Utah's pension 
statute for 1999 and 2000 are:2 
1. It contains no requirement that a retiree be a Utah 
taxpayer to qualify for the pension increase;3 
2. It establishes a 3% pension increase and is not 
tied to the graduated marginal income tax rates (Utah's 
income tax rates are not 3% across the board.);4 
2
 Section 49-1-701 (1998) was renumbered by Laws of Utah 
2002, ch. 250, § 44, and is now codified at Section 49-11-
701 (2002). 
' Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1998). 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (2) (a) and (b) (1998) 
provide: 
(2) £ny member who meets the conditions 
established under Subsection (1) shall receive the 
following: 
(a) the administrator shall calculate the 
members retirement allowance pursuant to 
the formula governing the system from 
which the member retired; 
(b) the administrator shall then increase 
the allowance calculated under Subsection 
(2) (a) by 3%. . . 
See also Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-104(2) (2000) (graduated tax 
rates for applicable years in Plaintiffs' Complaint). 
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3. It is funded through contributions;5 
4. It provides for a new basis in the retirement 
allowance, irrespective of any past, current, or future tax 
rate changes;6 and 
5. It lacks language stating that it is part of a 
claim of settlement for state retirees.7 
These elements distinguish Utah's pension increase 
statute from the statutes found in the two cases relied on 
by Plaintiffs. 
2. The Montana Sheehy Decision Supports 
Dismissal Of This Case. 
The decision of the Montana Supreme Court supports 
dismissal of the Complaint. Plaintiffs have failed to 
identify the sections of the Montana statute that the 
' Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701(6) (a) (1998); see also id. at 
Section 49-1-103(10) for definition of "contribution." 
6 N
'[T]he adjusted retirement allowance under Subsection 
(2)(b) is the new basis upon which any future adjustments to 
benefits are made." Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (2)(c) (1998). 
The Tax Commission has taken the position that the 1989 pension 
increase provided for a vested right in the pension increase 
irrespective of any past, current, or future tax rate changes. 
However, the State of Utah has not been named a party to this 
action and as such, it has not spoken on the vested nature of the 
pension increase. This Court need not reach the vesting issue, 
because it is undisputed that the legislature enact the pension 
increase irrespective of any past, current, or future tax rate 
change. 
7
 Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 (1998). 
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Montana Supreme Court relied on in Sheehy v. Public 
Employees Retirement Division, 864 P.2d 762 (Mont. 1993), to 
conclude that Montana's statute was in violation of 4 U.S.C. 
§ 111. The offending provisions do not exist under Utah's 
law. Accordingly, Sheehy has no application here.8 
In Sheehy, the Montana Supreme Court invalidated the 
retirement adjustment payment contained in Montana law on 
two principal grounds. First, Montana law provided for an 
annual retirement benefit supplement only to retirees who 
had lost the tax exemption and were currently living in 
Montana. I_d. at 138.9 The Court reasoned that "The sole 
purpose of the adjustment was to partially recompense state 
retirees living in Montana for the tax they now must pay 
under the equalizing provisions of chapter 823 [the Montana 
statute enacted to remedy problems identified under 4 U.S.C. 
8
 Both Sheehy and Vogl, discussed below, go beyond the 
plain language of Davis. 
9
 The court stated: 
Et is clear that the adjustment is not an 
actual and legitimate pension or 
retirement benefit. If it were a pension 
benefit, the State would have provided it 
to all of its retirees in recognition of 
their years of public service rather than 
just those living in Montana. 
Id. at 138 (emphasis added). 
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§ 111]." Id. 
Second, the funding provisions for the retirement 
compensation increase bore "no resemblance to the funding of 
actual state retirement benefit adjustments previously 
enacted by the legislature." I_d. Previously, funding for 
the Montana Public Employee Retirement Programs was "by 
investment income produced by the retirement fund made up of 
employee and employer contributions." .Id. With the 
offending statute, "[t]he funding for the so called 
retirement adjustment payment is statutorily appropriated 
from the general fund [on an annual basis] . . . that is, 
from the taxes collected from all Montana taxpayers. The 
money to pay the adjustment never goes into the state 
retirement funds, but is simply paid by the state treasurer 
to the retirement board. . . . " Id. 
This Court should not adopt that reasoning. First, 
under Utah law, as cited in the previous section of this 
brief, there is no residency limitation on the payment of 
the pension increase. A retiree need not even be a Utah 
taxpayer to qualify. All retirees benefit equally, 
independent of their tax status. Accordingly, the Montana 
statute has no analogous application to Utah. Second, under 
27 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701(6), the Utah retirement allowance 
is on its face a pension increase funded by contributions. 
Plaintiffs concede that the pension increase here is not 
directly funded from the general fund. (Appellant's Opening 
Brief at 21 n.4, 23 n.5.) 
Plaintiffs' reliance on Sheehy is without merit. This 
Court would need to go beyond Sheehy and create new law to 
hold in Plaintiffs' favor. 
3. The Analysis Of The Oregon Supreme Court 
In Its Later Vogl Decision Also Supports 
Dismissal Of The Complaint. 
In the second Oregon pension decision, the Oregon 
Supreme Court invalidated a statute that was enacted to 
resolve claims of state retirees after the tax exemption was 
removed from the Oregon retirement code. Vogl v. Pep't of 
Rev., 960 P.2d 373 (Oregon 1998). The Oregon court 
invalidated the statute on narrow grounds and concluded that 
the relationship between the lost tax exemption and the 
pension increase given in the statute was "not merely one of 
logical causation . . . but of purported legal equivalence." 
Id. at 381. 
The court relied on the following elements of the 
Oregon statute to invalidate it. First, the pension 
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increase calculation ran parallel to "the maximum state 
income tax rate, including allowing the increase to rise and 
fall along with that rate." Id. at 380. The court 
concluded that "the formula is as close as the state can get 
to replicating the effect of the repealed tax exemption 
without delving into individual tax circumstances." Id. 
Second, by the express terms of the Oregon statute, no 
state retiree "^shall acquire a right, contractual or 
otherwise, to the increased benefits provided [therein.]'" 
Id. (quoting the offending Oregon statute). The court 
reasoned that if the state were paying an actual pension 
increase that the court "would expect those employees to 
obtain a vested right to it." Id. 
Finally, the court reasoned, the statute expressly 
stated that it was intended to represent "^full, complete, 
and final payment of any claim of a member of the system . . 
. arising out of the taxation of those benefits.'" Id. 
(quoting the offending Oregon statute). In other words, the 
"legislature's designation of the increase as legal 
compensation shows . . . that it is not a mere benefit 
increase." Id. 
These elements do not exist under the Utah statute. 
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First, as discussed above, the pension increase provisions 
of the Utah statute do not run parallel to the Utah Tax 
Code. Second, exactly opposite of Oregon's statute, the 
three percent Utah pension increase provides for a new basis 
in the retirement allowance. Finally, the Utah statute does 
not contain the state retiree claim settlement language 
contained in the Oregon statute. Although Plaintiffs allege 
a breach of contract by Utah against state retirees, they 
offer no legal support for this argument, nor was it pled in 
their complaint. Vogl provides no reason that the district 
court was incorrect in dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should hold that the district court properly 
dismissed for failure to state a claim because Plaintiffs 
are not entitled to a tax exemption under Davis and the 
doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity. 
DATED this Z ^ / - day of November, 2003. 
«Lcy^c— 
HN C. McCARRtY 1 
MOTHY A. BODILY J 
sistant Attorneys General 
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ADDENDUM A 
4USCA§ 111 
4U.S.C.A. § 111 
Page 1 
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 4. FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMEN \ \ n : ;n- s'i \ ! IS 
CHAPTER 4-THE STATES 
§ 111. Same; taxation affecting Federal employees; income tax 
(a) General rule.—The United States consents to the taxation of pay or compensation for personal service as an 
officer or employee of the United States, a territory or possession or political subdivision thereof, the government 
of the District of Columbia, or an agency or instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, by a duly constituted 
taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of 
the source of the pay or compensation. 
(b) Treatment <>l certain ledcral employees employed at Federal hulroelectnc facilities locatnl i 
Columbia River.-Pa\ or compensation paid by the United States for personal services as an employee oi the 
IJnited States at j hydroelectric facility— 
(1) wh\\ h i-, on iled I)-, flie ('iiited States; 
(2) which is located on the Columbia River; and 
(3) portions of which are within the States of Oregon and Washington, 
shall be subject to taxation by the State or any political subdivision thereof of which such employee is a resident 
(e) ' I reatment of cei tain Federal employees employed at Federal hydroelectric facilities lot a ted m- m. 
Missouri River.—Pay or compensation paid by the United States for personal services as an employee ot the 
United States at a hydroelectric facility— 
(1) \' h i c 11 i s o w ii c d b y th e 1 111 i te d S t a te s; 
(2) which is located on the Missouri River; and 
(3) portions of which are within the States of South Dakota and Nebraska, 
shall be subject to taxation by the State or any political subdivision thereof of which such employee is a resident. 
CRHDi HN> 
(Added Pub.L. 89-554, § 2(c), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 608, ai i< 1 amei ided I "til ).T 105 261 Div !"* ' I itk i X, § 
1075(b)(1), Oct. 17, 1998, 112 Stat. 2138.) 
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UTAH' CODE, 1953 
Copyright © 1953, 1960-1963, 1966, 1968-1971, 1973, 1974, 1976-1978, 1981, 
1982, 1984 by The Allen Smith Company; Copyright © 1986-1990 by The Michie 
Company. All rights reserved. 
TITLE 49. PENSIONS 
CHAPTER 1. UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT 
PART 7. TAXATION PROVISIONS 
49-1-701. Retirement allowance increase to offset tax liability -- Administration. 
(1) This section applies to members of any system administered by the board 
under Title 4 9, whose retirement allowance remained exempt from the tax imposed 
under Chapter 10, Title 59, pursuant to Section 2, Chapter 195, Laws of Utah 1988, 
but whose allowance has subsequently become subject to that tax. 
(2) Any member who meets the conditions established under Subsection (1) shall 
receive the following: 
(a) the administrator shall calculate the member's retirement allowance 
pursuant to the formula governing the system from which the member retired; 
(b) the administrator shall then increase the allowance calculated under 
Subsection (2)(a) by 3%; and 
(c) the adjusted retirement allowance under Subsection (2)(b) is the new basis 
upon which any future adjustments to benefits are made. 
(3) (a) For all members who retire or are receiving retirement allowances in 
calendar year 1989, the administrator shall apply the 3% adjustment under 
Subsection (2) to all retirement allowances received in 1989, so that the period 
for which the allowance becomes subject to the tax under Chapter 10, Title 59, and 
the period for which the 3% adjustment is given are the same. 
(b) For all members who retire after December 31, 1989, and who meet the 
requirements of Subsection (1), the administrator shall apply the 3% adjustment 
under Subsection (2) beginning on the effective date of retirement. 
(4) Any penalty or interest for underpayment of taxes under Chapter 1 or 10, 
Title 59, shall be waived for members whose noncompliance is attributable to 
Section 49-1-608 and this section. This only applies to tax year 1989. 
(5) The administrator shall comply with Part 4, Chapter 10, Title 59, with 
respect to withholding of taxes. 
(6) The retirement board shall annually certify the contribution rate necessary 
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U.C.A. 1953 §49-1-701 
Page 2 
for each system to comply with this section and may adopt rules to administer this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 49-1-701, enacted by L. 1989 (2nd S.S.), ch. 8, § 1; 1990, ch. 
42, § 1; 1990, ch. 285, § 6. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. -- The 1990 amendment by ch. 42, effective March 7, 1990, 
substituted "Subsection" for "Section" in Subsection (2)(c) and deleted former 
Subsection (7), relating to legislative review of the benefit adjustment. 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 285, effective July 1, 1990, added the second sentence 
in Subsection (4). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and 
General Counsel. 
Compiler's Notes. -- Laws 1988, ch. 195, § 2, cited in Subsection (1), made § 
49-1-608, exempting benefits from taxation except for the individual income tax, 
applicable "only to the retirement allowance of persons who entered a system 
administered by the retirement office on or after [January 1, 1989]." Laws 1988, 
ch. 195, § 2 was repealed by Laws 1989 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 3 and ch. 7, § 3. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989 (2nd S.S.)r ch. 8, § 2 makes the act effective on 
October 10, 1989. 
U. C. A. 1953 § 49-1-701 
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109S.Q. 1500 
103 L.Ed.2d 891, 57 USLW 4389, 63 A.F.I .R.2d v)-1 i 
(Cite as: 489 U.S. 803,109 S.Ct. 1500) 
f> 
Supreme Court of the United States 
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY. 
No. 87-1020. 
Argued Jan. 9, 1989. 
Decided March 28, 1989. 
Former federal employee brought suit seeking 
refunds of state taxes paid on his federal retirement 
benefits. The Michigan Court of Claims denied 
relief. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals, 
160 Mich.App. 98, 408 N.W.2d 433, affirmed. 
After the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to 
appeal, probable jurisdiction was noted. The 
Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, held that 
Michigan Income Tax Act violated principles of 
intergovernmental tax immunity by favoring retired 
state and local government employees over retired 
federal employees. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion. 
Opinion on remand 1 ) 9 I \ich ;pp. 683, 1 16 
N.W.2d531. 
West Headnotes 
i \ j t i o n ^ — ' 9 8 7 
;"lk9N7 Most Cited Cases 
Federal statute authorizing states to tax "pay or 
compensation for personal services as [a federal] 
officer or employee * * * if the taxation does not 
discriminate against the employee because of the 
source of the pay or compensation" applied to 
federal retirees, and was not limited to current 
federal employees. 4 U.S.C.A. §111. 
;2| Miiiutes€==>212.7 
M>!k212.7 Most Cited Cases 
I e 1 
, iVJ-2 ( ~'U ) ' •'• •• Linplowc iJcnclits v a> •'•• 
(Formerly 36lk212) 
When Congress codifies a judicially defined 
concept, it is presumed, absent express statement to 
the contrary, that Congress intended to adopt 
interpretation placed on that concept by the courts. 
Mj i .uauon €=>Q87 
371k9S7 Most Cited Cases 
Statutory intergovernmental tax immunity for state 
taxes that discriminate against federal employees on 
basis of source of their compensation is coextensive 
with prohibition against discriminatory taxes 
embodied in modem constitutional doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity. 4 U.S.C.A. § 111. 
[4] Taxation €=>987 
371k987 Most Cited Cases 
Michigan Income Tax Act, which exempted from 
taxation all retirement benefits paid by the state or 
its political subdivisions, but taxed retirement 
benefits paid by other employees, including 
employees of federal government, violated 
principles of intergovernmental tax immunity. 4 
U.S.C.A. § 111 
15] I axation €=>987 
371k987 Most Cited Cases 
1 'pnn determining that Michigan Income Tax Act 
;i)]jk'ii principles of intergovernmental tax 
immunity by favoring retired state and local 
government employees over retired federal 
employees, federal retiree's claim could be resolved 
either by extending tax exemption to retired federal 
employees, or to all retired employees, or by 
eliminating exemption for retired state and local 
government employees. 4 U.S.C.A. § 111. 
**1501 Syllabus [FN*] 
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the Court but has been prepared 
by the Reporter of Decisions for the 
convenience of the reader. See United 
States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 
321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 I .Ed. 499. 
M. . . . ••* :r. • >ea;
 : rro- thiough WS4, 
appellant .« Mulligan resident and former i.-.vral 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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(Cite as: 489 U.S. 803,109 S.Ct. 1500) 
employee, paid state income tax on his federal 
letirement benefits in accordance with the Michigan 
Income Tax Act, which exempts from taxation all 
retirement benefits paid by the State or its political 
subdivisions, but taxes retirement benefits paid by 
other employers, including the Federal Government 
After the State denied appellant's request for 
refunds, he filed suit in the Michigan Court of 
Claims, alleging that the State's inconsistent 
treatment of retirement benefits violated 4 U S C § 
111, which authorizes States to tax "pay or 
compensation for personal services as [a federal] 
officer or employee , if the taxation does not 
discriminate against the employee because of the 
source of the pay or compensation" The Court of 
Claims denied lelief, and the Michigan Court of 
Appeals affirmed, ruling that appellant is an 
"annuitant" under federal law rather than an 
"employee" within the meaning of § 111, and that 
that section therefore has no application to him 
The Court of Appeals also held that the doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity did not render the 
State's discriminatory tax scheme unconstitutional, 
since the discrimination was justified under a 
rational-basis test The State's interest in attracting 
and retaining qualified employees was a legitimate 
objective which was rationally achieved by a 
letirement plan offering economic inducements 
Held 
1 Section 111 applies to federal retirees such as 
appellant The State's contention that the section is 
limited to cunent federal employees is refuted by 
the plain language of the statute's first clause 
Since the amount of civil service retirement benefits 
is based and computed upon an individual's salary 
and years of service, it represents deferred 
compensation for service to the Government, and 
therefore constitutes "pay or compensation as [a 
federal] employee" withm the meaning of that 
clause The State's contention that, since this 
quoted language does not occur in the statute's 
second, nondiscrimination clause, that clause 
applies only to cunent employees, is hypertechnical 
and fails to read the nondiscrimination clause in its 
context within the overall statutory scheme The 
reference to "the pay or compensation" in the latter 
clause must, in context, mean the same "pay or 
compensation" defined in *804 the section's first 
clause and thus includes retirement benefits The 
State's reading of the clause is implausible because 
Copi © West 2003 No Claim 
Page 2 
, 89-2 USTC P 9456, 10 Employee Benefits Cas 2097 
it is unlikely that Congiess consented to 
discriminatory taxation of retired federal civil 
servants' pensions while refusing to permit such 
taxation of current employees, and there is nothing 
in the statutory language or legislative history to 
suggest such a result Pp 1503-1505 
2 Section I l l ' s language, purpose, and legislative 
history establish that the scope of its 
nondiscrimination clause's grant or retention of 
limited tax immunity for federal employees is 
coextensive with, and must be determined by 
reference to, **1502 the prohibition against 
discriminatory taxes embodied in the modern 
constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax 
immunity Pp 1505-1507 
3 Michigan's tax scheme violates principles of 
intergovernmental tax immunity by favoring retired 
state and local government employees over retired 
federal employees Pp 1507-1508 
(a) The State's contention that appellant is not 
entitled to claim the protection of the immunity 
doctrine is without merit Although the doctrine is 
based on the need to protect each sovereign's 
governmental operations from undue interference 
by another sovereign, this Court's precedents 
establish that private entities or individuals who are 
subjected to discriminatory taxation on account of 
their dealings with a sovereign can themselves 
receive the protection of the constitutional doctrine 
See, for example, Phillips Chemical Co v Dumas 
Independent School Dist 361 U S 376, 387, 80 
SCt 474, 481, 4 L Ed 2d 384 Pp 1506-1507 
(b) In determining whethei the State's inconsistent 
tax tieatment of federal and state retirees is 
permissible, the relevant inquiry is whether the 
inconsistency is directly related to and justified by 
"significant differences between the two classes " 
Phillips, supia, at 384-385, 80 SCt , at 479- 480 
The State's claimed interest in hiring qualified civil 
servants through the inducement of a tax exemption 
for retirement benefits is irrelevant to this inquiry, 
since it merely demonstrates that the State has a 
rational reason for discriminating between two 
similar groups of retnees without demonstrating any 
differences between those groups themselves 
Moreover, the State's claim that its retirement 
benefits are significantly less munificent than 
federal benefits in terms of vesting requirements, 
Orig U S Govt Works 
109 SCt 1500 
103 L Ed 2d 891, 57 USLW 4389, 63 Ab I lild^) 
(Cite as: 489 U.S. 803,109 S.Ct. 1500) 
1 
I &) 1 I )I( 1 ' ) l n II 1 iuplo)tt Benefits I as MJV 
rate ot accrual, and benefit computations is 
insufficient to justify the type of blanket exemption 
at issue here A ta\ exemption tiul> intended to 
account for differences in benefits would not 
discriminate on the basis of the source of those 
benefits, but w ould, rather, discriminate on the basis 
of the amount of benefits received b> individual 
retirees Pp 1507-1508 
J Because tin Stati concedes that a ielund is 
appropriate in these circumstances, appellant is 
entitled to a refund to the extent he has paid *805 
taxes pursuant to the invalid Michigan scheme 
However, his additional claim for prospective relief 
from discilminatory taxation should be decided by 
the state comts, whose special expertise in state law 
puts them in a better position than this Court to 
fashion the remedy most appiopnate to comply with 
the constitutional mandate of equal treatment Pp 
1S08-1S0Q 
Michael K Kellogg, Washington, D C , toi the 
U S , as amicus cunae, supporting appellant b\ 
special leave oi Couit 
Thomas L Casey, Lansing, Mich , foi appellee 
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the 
( oui t 
The State ot Michigan exempts from taxation all 
retirement benefits paid by the State or its political 
subdivisions, but levies an income tax on retirement 
benefits paid by all other employers, including the 
Federal Government The question presented by 
this case is whether Michigan's tax scheme violates 
federal law 
I 
160 MichApp 98, 408 N \\ 2d 433 (1987) 
it v11sed and lemanded 
KENNEDY, J , delivered the opinion of the Court, 
m which RFHNQUIST, C J , and BRENNAN, 
WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, 
O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ, joined STEVENS 
J filed a dissenting opinion, post p — 
Paul S Da\is pio se aigued the cause and iilul 
briefs for appellant 
Mi dun I k ktllogg aigued the cause ioi the United 
States as amicus cuuae urging rev eisal With him 
on the brief vveie Sohcitoi Geneial Filed Assistant 
Attorney Geneial Rose Deputy Sohcitoi Geneial 
Men ill Da\id English Caimack and Ste\en IV 
Paiks 
Thomas L Case\ Assistant Solicitor Geneial of 
Michigan, aigued the cause for appellee With him 
on the bnef were FiankJ Kelley, Attorney General, 
Louis J Caiuso Solicitor General, and Richaid R 
Roesch and Ross H Bishop Assistant Attorneys 
General * 
* Joseph B Scott and Michael J katof tiled a bnei 
for the National Association of Retired Federal 
Fmplovees as amicus cunae urging reversal 
Fml S Davis foi appellant 
Appellant Paul S Davis a Michigan 
resident, is a formei employee of the 
United States Government He receives 
retnement *806 benefits **1503 pursuant 
to the Civil Service Retirement Act, 5 
U S C § 8331 et seq In each of the years 
1979 thiough 1984, appellant paid 
Michigan state income tax on his federal 
letirement benefits in accordance with 
Mich Comp Laws Ann § 206 30(l)(f) 
(Supp 1988) [FN1] That statute defines 
taxable income in a manner that excludes 
all retirement benefits received fiom the 
State oi its political subdivisions, but 
includes most other forms of retirement 
benefits [FN2] The effect of this 
definition is that the ietnement benefits of 
retired state employees are exempt from 
state taxation while the benefits received 
b) letned fedeial employees are not 
FN1 As a result of a series of amendments, this 
subsection has been variously designated as (l)(f) 
(l)(g), and (l)(h) at times relevant to this litigation 
This opinion will refer only to the cunent fatiif H\ 
designation, §206 30(1 )(f) 
TT\J In peitintnt pait the statute piovides 
( 1) I a\abk income means idjusted 
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gioss income as defined in the internal 
revenue code subject to the following 
adjustments 
ijc * sfc 
"(f) Deduct to the extent included in 
adjusted gross income 
"(1) Retirement or pension benefits 
received from a public retirement system 
of or created by an act of this state or a 
political subdivision of this state 
* * * 
"(IV) Retirement or pension benefits from 
any othei retirement or pension system as 
follows "(A) For a single return, the sum 
of not more than $7,500 00 
"(B) Foj a joint return, the sum of not 
more than $10,000 00" Mich Comp Laws 
Ann § 206 30(l)(i) (Supp 1988) 
Subsection (f)(iv) of this piovision 
exempts a portion of otherwise taxable 
retirement benefits from taxable income, 
but appellant's retirement pay from all 
nonstate sources exceeded the applicable 
exemption amount in each of the tax years 
relevant to this case 
In 1984, appellant petitioned for refunds of state 
taxes paid on his fedeial retirement benefits 
between 1979 and 1983 After his request was 
denied, appellant filed suit in the Michigan Court of 
Claims Appellant's complaint, which was 
amended to include the 1984 tax yeai, averred that 
his federal retirement benefits were "not legally 
taxable undei *807 the Michigan Income Tax Law" 
and that the State's inconsistent treatment of state 
and federal retirement benefits discriminated 
against fedeial retnees in violation of 4 U S C § 111 
, which preserves federal employees' immunity from 
discriminatory state taxation See Public Salary 
Tax Act of 1939, ch 59, § 4, 53 Stat 575, codified, 
as amended, at 4 U S C § 111 The Court of 
Claims, however, denied relief No 84-9451 (Oct 
30, 1985), App toJuns Statement A10 
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed 160 
Mich App 98, 408 NW2d 433 (1987) The court 
first lejected appellant's claim that 4 U S C § 111 
Page 4 
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invalidated the State's tax on appellant's federal 
benefits Noting that § 111 applies only to federal 
"employees," the court determined that appellant's 
status under federal law was that of an "annuitant" 
rather than an employee As a consequence, the 
court concluded that § 111 "has no application to 
[Davis], since [he] cannot be considered an 
employee within the meaning of that act" Id, at 
104, 408 NW 2d, at 435 
The Michigan Court of Appeals next rejected 
appellant's contention that the doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity rendered the State's 
tax treatment of federal retirement benefits 
unconstitutional Conceding that "a tax may be 
held invalid if it operates to discriminate against 
the federal government and those with whom it 
deals," id at 104, 408 NW2d, at 436, the court 
examined the State's justifications for the 
discrimination under a rational- basis test Ibid 
The court determined that the State's interest in 
"attracting and retaining qualified employees" 
was a "legitimate state objective which is rationally 
achieved by a retnement plan offering economic 
inducements," and it upheld **1504 the statute Id, 
at 105, 408 NW 2d, at 436 
The Supreme Court of Michigan denied appellant's 
application for leave to appeal 429 Mich 854, 412 
NW2d 220 (1987) We noted probable 
jurisdiction 487 U S 1217, 108 SCt 2868, 101 
L Ed 2d 904(1988) 
*808 II 
Appellant places principal reliance on 4 U S C § 
111 In relevant part, that section provides 
"The United States consents to the taxation of pay 
or compensation for personal service as an officer 
or employee of the United States by a duly 
constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if 
the taxation does not discriminate against the 
officer or employee because of the source of the 
pay or compensation " 
[1] As a threshold matter, the State argues that § 
111 applies only to current employees of the 
Federal Government, not to retirees such as 
appellant In our view, however, the plain 
language of the statute dictates the opposite 
conclusion Section 111 by its terms applies to "the 
taxation of pay or compensation foi peisonal 
Copi £ West 2003 No Claim to Orig U S Govt Works 
109S.Q. 1500 l\i 
103 L.Ed.2d 891, 57 USLW 4389, 63 A . h l . R J d V M I ,4,89-2 USU IJiH><», lo hniplo>cc Hcnciits C as JO(i/ 
(Cite as: 489 U.S. 803,109 S.Ct. 1500) 
services as an officer or employee of the United 
States." (Emphasis added). While retirement pay 
is not actually disbursed during the time an 
individual is working for the Government, the 
amount of benefits to be received in retirement is 
based and computed upon the individual's salary 
and years of service. 5 U.S.C. § 8339(a). We have 
no difficulty concluding that civil service retirement 
benefits are deferred compensation for past years of 
service rendered to the Government. See, e.g., 
Zitcker v. United States, 758 F.2d 637, 639 (CA 
Fed.), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 842, 106 S.Ct. 129, 88 
L.Ed.2d 105 (1985); Kizas v. Webster, 227 
U.S.App.D.C. 327, 339, 707 F.2d 524, 536 (1983), 
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 1042, 104 S.Ct. 709, 79 
L.Ed.2d 173 (1984); Clark v United States, 691 
F.2d 837, 842 (CA7 1982). And because these 
benefits accme to employees on account of their 
service to the Government, they fall squarely within 
the category of compensation for services rendered 
"as an officer or employee of the United States." 
Appellant's federal retirement benefits are deferred 
compensation earned "as" a federal employee, and 
so are subject to § 111. [FN3] 
FN3. The State suggests that the legislative 
history does not support this interpretation 
of § 111, pointing to statements in the 
Committee Reports that describe the scope 
of § 111 without using the phrase "service 
as an officer or employee." The language 
of the statute leaves no room for doubt on 
this point, however, so the State's attempt 
to establish a minor inconsistency with the 
legislative history need not detain us. 
Legislative history is irrelevant to the 
interpretation of an unambiguous statute. 
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 
U.S. 192, 199, 98 S.Ct. 444, 448, 54 
L.Ed.2d 402 (1977). 
*809 Ihe State points out, however, that the 
reference to "compensation for personal services as 
an officer or employee" occurs in the first part of § 
111, which defines the extent of Congress' consent 
to state taxation, and not in the latter part of the 
section, which provides that the consent does not 
extend to taxes that discriminate against federal 
employees. Instead, the nondiscrimination clause 
speaks only in terms of "discriminatfion] against the 
officer or employee because of the source of the pay 
or compensation." From this the State concludes 
that, whatever the scope of Congress' consent to 
taxation in the first portion of § 111, the 
nondiscrimination clause applies only to current 
federal employees. 
Although the State's hypertechmcal reading of the 
nondiscrimination clause is not inconsistent with the 
language of that provision examined in isolation, 
statutory language cannot be construed in a \ acuiim. 
It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction 
that the words of a statute must be read in their 
context and with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme. See United States v. Morton, 
467 U.S. 822, 828, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 2773, 81 
L.Ed.2d 680 (1984). When the first part of § 111 
is **1505 read together with the nondiscrimination 
clause, the operative words of the statute are as 
follows: "The United States consents to the 
taxation of pay or compensation ... if the taxation 
does not discriminate ... because of the source of the 
pay or compensation." The reference to "the pay 
or compensation" in the last clause of § 111 must, 
in context, mean the same "pay or compensation" 
defined in the first part of the section. Since that 
"pay or compensation" includes retirement benefits, 
the nondiscrimination clause must include them as 
well. 
A810 Any othei interpretation oi I he 
nondiscrimination clause would be implausible at 
best. It is difficult to imagine that Congress 
consented to discriminatory taxation of the pensions 
of retired federal civil servants while refusing to 
permit such taxation of current employees, and 
nothing in the statutory language or even in the 
legislative history suggests this result. While 
Congress could perhaps have used more pieeise 
language, the overall meaning of § 111 is 
unmistakable: it waives whatever immunity past 
and present federal employees would otherwise 
enjoy from state taxation of salaries, retirement 
benefits, and other forms of compensation paid on 
account of their employment with the Federal 
Government, except to the extent that such taxation 
discriminates on account of the source of the 
compensation. 
Ill 
Section 111 was enacted as part ol the Public 
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Salary Tax Act of 1939, the primary purpose of 
which was to impose federal income tax on the 
salaries of all state and local government 
employees Prior to adoption of the Act, salaries of 
most government employees, both state and federal, 
generally were thought to be exempt from taxation 
by another sovereign under the doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity This doctrine had 
its genesis in McCulloch v Maryland 4 Wheat 
316, 4 LEd 570 (1819), which held that the State 
of Maryland could not impose a discriminatory tax 
on the Bank of the United States Chief Justice 
Marshall's opinion for the Court reasoned that the 
Bank was an instrumentality of the Federal 
Government used to carry into effect the 
Government's delegated powers, and taxation by the 
State would unc onstitutionally interfere with the 
exercise of those powers Id at 425-437 
For a time, McCulloch was read bioadly to bar 
most taxation by one sovereign of the employees of 
another See Collectoi \ Day 11 Wall 113, 
124-128, 20 LEd 122 (1871) (invalidating federal 
income tax on salary of state judge), *811Dobbms 
v Commissioner of Ene County 16 Pet 435, 10 
LEd 1022 (1842) (invalidating state tax on federal 
officer) This rule "was based on the rationale that 
any tax on income a party received under a contiact 
with the government was a tax on the contract and 
thus a tax 'on' the government because it bmdened 
the gov ernment's power to enter into the contract" 
South Cawhna \ Bakei 485 US 505, 518, 108 
SCt 1355, 1364, 99 LEd 2d 592 (1988) 
In subsequent cases, howevei the Court began to 
rum away fiom its more expansive applications of 
the immunity doctrine Thus, in Hehenng v 
Geihaidt 304 US 405, 58 SCt 969, 82 LEd 
1427 (1938), the Court held that the Federal 
Government couli levy nondiscriminatory taxes on 
the incomes of most state employees The 
following year, Gia\es \ New Yoik ex lei O'Keefe 
306 US 466, 486-487, 59 SCt 595, 601-602, 83 
LEd 927 (1939) overruled the Da\- Dobbins line 
of cases that had exempted government employees 
from nondiscriminatory taxation After Giaves 
theiefore, mteigovernmental tax immunity barred 
only those taxes that were imposed directly on one 
sovereign by the other or that discriminated against 
a sovereign or tho>e with whom it dealt 
It was in the midst of this judicial revision of the 
immunity doctrine that Congress decided to extend 
the federal income tax to state and local government 
employees The Public Salary Tax Act was 
enacted **1506 after Helve?ing v Geihaidt, supia, 
had upheld the imposition of federal income taxes 
on state civil servants, and Congress relied on that 
decision as support for its broad assertion of federal 
taxing authority S Rep No 112, 76th Cong, 1st 
Sess, 5-9 (1939), HRRep No 26, 76th Cong, 
1st Sess, 2-3 (1939) However, the Act was 
drafted, considered m Committee, and passed by the 
House of Representatives before the announcement 
of the decision m Giaves v New Yoik ex lei 
O'Keefe supia, which for the first time permitted 
state taxation of federal employees As a result, 
during most of the legislative process leading to 
adoption of the Act it was unclear whether state 
taxation of federal employees was still barred by 
intergovernmental *812 tax immunity despite the 
abrogation of state employees' immunity from 
federal taxation See HRRep No 26, supia, at 2 
("There are certain indications in the case of 
McCulloch \ Maryland 4 Wheat 316 [4 LEd 
579] (1819), that Federal officers and 
employees may not, without the consent of the 
United States, be subjected to income taxation 
under the authority of the various States") 
Dissatisfied with this uncertain state of affairs, and 
concerned that considerations of fairness demanded 
equal tax treatment for state and federal employees, 
Congress decided to ensure that federal employees 
would not remain immune from state taxation at the 
same time that state government employees were 
being required to pay federal income taxes See 
SRep No 112, supia at 4, HRRep No 26, 
supia at 2 Accordingly, § 4 of the proposed Act 
(now § 111) expressly waived whatever immunity 
would have otherwise shielded federal employees 
fiom nondiscriminatory state taxes 
By the time the statute was enacted, of course, the 
decision in Giaves had been announced, so the 
constitutional immunity doctrine no longer 
proscribed nondiscriminatory state taxation of 
federal employees In effect, § 111 simply codified 
the result in Gia\es and foreclosed the possibility 
that subsequent judicial reconsideration of that case 
might reestablish the broader interpretation of the 
immunity doctrine 
Section 111 did not waive all aspects of 
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intergovernmental tax immunity, however. I he 
final clause of the section contains an exception for 
state taxes that discriminate against federal 
employees on the basis of the source of their 
compensation. This nondiscrimination clause 
closely parallels the nondiscrimination component 
of the constitutional immunity doctrine which has, 
from the time of McCuUoch v. Maiyland, barred 
taxes that "operat[e] so as to discriminate against 
the Government or those with whom it deals." 
United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473, 
78 S.Ct. 474, 478, 2 L.Ed.2d 424 (1958). See also 
McCuUoch v. Maryland, supra, 4 Wheat., at 
436-437; *8l3MiIler v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713, 
714-715, 47 S.Ct. 280, 280-281, 71 L.Ed. 487 
(1927); Helvering v. Gerhardt, supra, 304 U.S., at 
413, 58 S.Ct., at 972; Phillips Chemical Co. v. 
Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 
385, 80 S.Ct. 474, 480, 4 L.Ed.2d 384 (1960); 
Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 
392, 397, and n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 692, 696, and n. 7, 74 
L.Ed.2d 562 (1983). 
[2][3] In view of the similarity of language and 
purpose between the constitutional principle of 
nondiscrimination and the statutory 
nondiscrimination clause, and given that § 111 was 
consciously drafted against the background of the 
Court's tax immunity cases, it is reasonable to 
conclude that Congress drew upon the constitutional 
doctrine in defining the scope of the immunity 
retained in § 111. When Congress codifies a 
judicially defined concept, it is presumed, absent an 
express statement to the contrary, that Congress 
intended to adopt the interpretation placed on that 
concept by the courts. See Midi an tic National 
Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental 
Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501, 106 S.Ct. 755, 
759-760, 88 L.Ed.2d 859 (1986); Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 
249-250, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). Hence, we 
conclude that the retention **1507 of immunity in § 
111 is coextensive with the prohibition against 
discriminatory taxes embodied in the modern 
constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax 
immunity. Cf. Memphis Bank & Trust, supra, 459 
U.S., at 396-397, 103 S.Ct., at 695-696 (construing 
31 U.S.C. § 742, which permits only " 
'nondiscriminatory' " state taxation of interest on 
federal obligations, as "principally a restatement of 
the constitutional rule"). 
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On its face, § 111 purports to be nothing more than 
a partial congressional consent to nondiscriminatory 
state taxation of federal employees. It can be 
argued, however, that by negative implication § 111 
also constitutes an affirmative statutory grant of 
immunity from discriminatory state taxation in 
addition to, and coextensive with, the pre-existing 
protection afforded by the constitutional doctrine. 
Regardless of whether § 111 provides an 
independent basis for finding immunity or merely 
preserves the traditional constitutional prohibition 
against discriminatory taxes, however, the inquiry 
*814 is the same. In either case, the scope of the 
immunity granted or retained by the 
nondiscrimination clause is to be determined by 
reference to the constitutional doctrine. Thus, the 
dispositive question in this case is whether the tax 
imposed on appellant is barred by the doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity. 
IV 
[4J It is undisputed that Michigan's tax system 
discriminates in favor of retired state employees and 
against retired federal employees. The State 
argues, however, that appellant is not entitled to 
claim the protection of the immunity doctrine, and 
that in any event the State's inconsistent treatment 
of Federal and State Government retirees is justified 
by meaningful differences between the two classes. 
A 
In suppoit oi its inst contention, the State points 
out that the purpose of the immunity doctrine is to 
protect governments and not private entities or 
individuals. As a result, so long as the challenged 
tax does not interfere with the Federal 
Government's ability to perform its governmental 
functions, the constitutional doctrine has not been 
violated. 
It is fine that intergovernmental tax immunity is 
based on the need to protect each sovereign's 
governmental operations from undue interference 
by the other. Graves, 306 U.S., at 481, 59 S.Ct., at 
598; McCuUoch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., at 435-436 
. But it does not follow that private entities or 
individuals who are subjected to discriminatory 
taxation on account of their dealings with a 
sovereign cannot themselves receive the protection 
of the constitutional doctrine. Indeed, all precedent 
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is to the contrary. In Phillips Chemical Co., supra, 
for example, we considered a private corporation's 
claim that a state tax discriminated against private 
lessees of federal land. We concluded that the tax 
"discriminate^] unconstitutionally against the 
United States and its lessee," and accordingly held 
that the tax could not be exacted. Id., 361 U.S., at 
387, 80 S.Ct, at 481 *815 (emphasis added). See 
also Memphis Bank & Trust, supra; Moses Lake 
Homes, Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744, 81 
S.Ct. 870, 6 L.Ed.2d 66 (1961); Collector v. Day, 
11 Wall. 113, 20 L.Ed. 122 (1871); Dobbins v. 
Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, 10 
L.Ed. 1022 (1842). The State offers no reasons for 
departing from this settled rule, and we decline to 
do so. [FN4] 
FN4. The dissent argues that this tax is 
nondiscriminatory, and thus constitutional, 
because it "draws no distinction between 
the federal employees or retirees and the 
vast majority of voters in the State." Post, 
at 1512. In Phillips Chemical Co., 
however, we faced that precise situation: 
an equal tax burden was imposed on 
lessees of private, tax- exempt property 
and lessees of federal property, while 
lessees of state property paid a lesser tax, 
or in some circumstances none at all. 
Although we concluded that "[u]nder these 
circumstances, there appears to be no 
discrimination between the Government's 
lessees and lessees of private property," 
361 U.S., at 381, 80 S.Ct, at 478, we 
nonetheless invalidated the State's tax. 
This result is consistent with the 
underlying rationale for the doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity. The 
danger that a State is engaging in 
impermissible discrimination against the 
Federal Government is greatest when the 
State acts to benefit itself and those in 
privity with it. As we observed in Phillips 
Chemical Co., "it does not seem too much 
to require that the State treat those who 
deal with the Government as well as it 
treats those with whom it deals itself." Id., 
at 385, 80 S.Ct., at 480. 
We also take issue with the dissent's 
assertion that "it is peculiarly inappropriate 
to focus solely on the treatment of state 
governmental employees" because "[t]he 
State may always compensate in pay or 
salary for what it assesses in taxes." Post, 
at 1512. In order to provide the same 
after-tax benefits to all retired state 
employees by means of increased salaries 
or benefit payments instead of a tax 
exemption, the State would have to 
increase its outlays by more than the cost 
of the current tax exemption, since the 
increased payments to retirees would result 
in higher federal income tax payments in 
some circumstances. This fact serves to 
illustrate the impact on the Federal 
Government of the State's discriminatory 
tax exemption for state retirees. Taxes 
enacted to reduce the State's employment 
costs at the expense of the federal treasury 
are the type of discriminatory legislation 
that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax 
immunity is intended to bar. 
**1508B 
Under our precedents, "[t]he imposition of a 
heavier tax burden on [those who deal with one 
sovereign] than is imposed *816 on [those who deal 
with the other] must be justified by significant 
differences between the two classes." Phillips 
Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 
361 U.S., at 383, 80 S.Ct, at 479. In determining 
whether this standard of justification has been met, 
it is inappropriate to rely solely on the mode of 
analysis developed in our equal protection cases. 
We have previously observed that "our decisions in 
[the equal protection] field are not necessarily 
controlling where problems of intergovernmental 
tax immunity are involved," because "the 
Government's interests must be weighed in the 
balance." Id., at 385, 80 S.Ct, at 480. Instead, the 
relevant inquiry is whether the inconsistent tax 
treatment is directly related to, and justified by, 
"significant differences between the two classes." 
Id., at 383-385, 80 S.Ct, at 479-480. 
The State points to two allegedly significant 
differences between federal and state retirees. 
First, the State suggests that its interest in hiring and 
retaining qualified civil servants through the 
inducement of a tax exemption for retirement 
benefits is sufficient to justify the preferential 
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treatment of its retired employees. This argument 
is wholly beside the point, however, for it does 
nothing to demonstrate that there are "significant 
differences between the two classes" themselves; 
rather, it merely demonstrates that the State has a 
rational reason for discriminating between two 
similar groups of retirees. The State's interest in 
adopting the discriminatory tax, no matter how 
substantial, is simply irrelevant to an inquiry into 
the nature of the two classes receiving inconsistent 
treatment. See id., at 384, 80 S.Ct., at 479. 
Second, the State argues that its retirement benefits 
are significantly less munificent than those offered 
by the Federal Government, in terms of vesting 
requirements, rate of accmal, and computation of 
benefit amounts. The substantial differences in the 
value of the retirement benefits paid the two classes 
should, in the State's view, justify the inconsistent 
tax treatment. 
*817 Even assuming the State's estimate of the 
relative value of state and federal retirement 
benefits is generally correct, we do not believe this 
difference suffices to justify the type of blanket 
exemption at issue in this case. While the average 
retired federal civil servant receives a larger 
pension than his state counterpart, there are 
undoubtedly many individual instances in which the 
opposite holds true. A tax exemption truly 
intended to account for differences in retirement 
benefits would not discriminate on the basis of the 
source of those benefits, as Michigan's statute does; 
rather, it would discriminate on the basis of the 
amount of benefits received by individual retirees. 
Cf. Phillips Chemical Co., supra, at 384-385, 80 
S.Ct., at 479-480 (rejecting proffered rationale for 
State's **1509 unfavorable tax treatment of lessees 
of federal property, because an evenhanded 
application of the rationale would have resulted in 
inclusion of some lessees of State property in the 
disfavored class as well). 
V 
For these reasons, we conclude that the Michigan 
Income Tax Act violates principles of 
intergovernmental tax immunity by favoring retired 
state and local government employees over retired 
federal employees. The State having conceded that 
a refund is appropriate in these circumstances, see 
Brief for Appellee 63, to the extent appellant has 
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paid taxes pursuant to this invalid tax scheme, he is 
entitled to a refund. See lowa-Des Moines 
National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247, 52 
S.Ct. 133, 136, 76 I .Ed. 265 (1931). 
Appellant also seeks prospective relief from 
discriminatory taxation. With respect to this claim, 
however, we are not in the best position to ascertain 
the appropriate remedy. While invalidation of 
Michigan's income tax law in its entirety obviously 
would eliminate the constitutional violation, the 
Constitution does not require such a drastic 
solution. We have recognized, in cases involving 
invalid classifications in the distribution of 
government benefits, that the appropriate remedy 
"is a mandate of equal treatment, a result that can 
be *818 accomplished by withdrawal of benefits 
from the favored class as well as by extension of 
benefits to the excluded class." Heckler v. Mathews, 
465 U.S. 728, 740, 104 S.Ct. 1387, 1395, 79 
L.Ed.2d 646 (1984). See lowa-Des Moines 
National Bank, supra, 284 U.S., at 247, 52 S.Ct., at 
136; see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 
361, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 1807, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 (1970) 
(I Iar 1 a 11, J., c oneurring in j udgment). 
[5] In this ease,, appellant's claim could be resolved 
either by extending the tax exemption to retired 
federal employees (or to all retired employees), or 
by eliminating the exemption for retired state and 
local government employees. The latter approach, 
of course, could be construed as the direct 
imposition of a state tax, a remedy beyond the 
power of a federal court. See Moses Lake Homes, 
Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U.S., at 752, 81 S.Ct., at 
874 ("Federal courts may not assess or levy taxes"). 
The permissibility of either approach, moreover, 
depends in part on the severability of a portion of § 
206.30(1 )(f) from the remainder of the Michigan 
Income Tax Act, a question of state law within the 
special expertise of the Michigan courts. See Louis 
K. Liggett Co, v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 540-541, 53 
S.Ct. 481, 486-487, 77 L.Ed. 929 (1933). It 
follows that the Michigan courts are in the best 
position to determine how to comply with the 
mandate of equal treatment. The judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Justice STEVENS, dissenting 
The States can tax federal employees or private 
parties who do business with the United States so 
long as the tax does not discriminate against the 
United States South Cawhna v Bakei, 485 U S 
505, 523, 108 SCt 1355, 1366, 99 LEd2d 592 
(1988), United States v County of Fiesno, 429 
U S 452, 462, 97 S Ct 699, 704, 50 L Ed 2d 683 
(1977) The Court today strikes down a state tax 
that applies equally to the vast majority of Michigan 
residents, including federal employees, because it 
treats retired state employees differently from 
retired federal employees The Court's holding is 
not supported by the rationale for the 
intergovernmental lmmunitydoctrme *819 and is 
not compelled by our previous decisions I cannot 
join the unjustified, court-imposed restriction on a 
State's powei to administer its own affairs 
The constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental 
immunity, Justice Frankfurter explained, "finds its 
explanation and justification in avoiding the 
potentialities of **1510 friction and furthering the 
smooth operation of complicated governmental 
machinery" Cit\ of Detioit v Mini ay Coip, 355 
US 489, 504, IS SCt 458, 491, 2 L Ed 2d 441 
(1958) To protect the smooth operation of dual 
governments in a federal system, it was at one time 
thought necessaiy to prohibit state taxation of the 
salaries of officers and employees of the United 
States, Dobbins i Commissionei s of Eue County, 
16 Pet 435, 10 L Ed 1022 (1842), as well as 
federal taxation of the salaries of state officials 
Collectoi v Day 11 Wall 113, 20 L Ed 122(1871) 
The Court has since forsworn such "wooden 
formalism " Washington v United States 460 U S 
536, 544, 103 SCt 1344, 1349, 75 L Ed 2d 264 
(1983) 
The nondiscrimination rule recognizes the fact that 
the Federal Government has no voice in the policy 
decisions made by the several States The Federal 
Government's protection against state taxation that 
singles out fedenl agencies for special burdens is 
therefore provided by the Supremacy Clause of the 
Federal Constitution, the doctrine of 
mteigovernmental tax immunity, and statutes such 
as 4^USC § 111 [FN1] When the tax burden is 
shared equally by federal agents and the vast 
majority of a State's citizens, however, the 
nondiscrimination principle is not applicable and 
Copr © West 2003 No Claim 
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constitutional protection is not necessary As the 
Court explained in United States v County oj 
Fi esno 
FN1 The legislative history of 4 U S C § 
111 correctly describes the purpose of the 
nondiscrimination principle as "[t]o protect 
the Federal Government against the 
unlikely possibility of State and local 
taxation of compensation of Federal 
officers and employees which is aimed at, 
or threatens the efficient operation of, the 
Federal Government" H R Rep No 26, 
76th Cong, 1st Sess, 5 (1939), S Rep 
No 112, 76th Cong , 1st Sess, 12 (1939) 
*820 "The rule to be derived from the Court's 
more recent decisions, then, is that the economic 
burden on a federal function of a state tax 
imposed on those who deal with the Federal 
Government does not render the tax 
unconstitutional so long as the tax is imposed 
equally on the other similarly situated 
constituents of the State This rule returns to the 
original intent of M'CuUoch v Maiyland The 
political check against abuse of the taxing power 
found lacking m M'CuUoch, where the tax was 
imposed solely on the Bank of the United States, 
is present where the State imposes a 
nondiscriminatory tax only on its constituents or 
their artificially owned entities, and M'CuUoch 
foresaw the unfairness in forcing a State to 
exempt private individuals with beneficial 
interests in federal property from taxes imposed 
on similar interests held by others in private 
property Accordingly, M'CuUoch expressly 
excluded from its rule a tax on 'the interest which 
the citizens of Maryland may hold [in a federal 
instrumentality] in common with other property 
of the same description throughout the State' 4 
Wheat, at 436 " 429 U S , at 462-464, 97 S Ct, 
at 704-706 [FN2] 
FN2 The quotation in the text omits one 
footnote, but this footnote is relevant 
"11 A tax on the income of federal 
employees, or a tax on the possessory 
interest of federal employees in 
Government houses, if imposed only on 
them, could be escalated by a State so as to 
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destioy the federal function performed by 
them either by making the Federal 
Government unable to hire anyone or by 
causing the Federal Government to pay 
prohibitively high salaries This danger 
would never arise, howe\ei, if the tax is 
also imposed on the income and property 
interests of all other residents and voters of 
the State " 429 U S , at 463, 97 S Ct, at 
705 
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
the rationale of the nondiscrimination rule 
is met when there is a political check 
against excessive taxation See South 
Caiohna \ Bakei 485 US 505, 526, n 
15, 108 SCt 1355, 1368, n 15, 99 
LEd 2d 592 (1988) ("[T]he best safeguard 
against excessive taxation (and the most 
judicially manageable) is the requirement 
that the government tax in a 
nondiscriminatory fashion For where a 
government imposes a nondiscriminatory 
tax, judges can term the tax 'excessive' 
only by second-guessing the extent to 
which the taxing government and its 
people have taxed themselves, and the 
threat of destroying another government 
can be realized only if the taxing 
government is willing to impose taxes that 
will also destioy itself oi its constituents"), 
Washington \ United States 460 US 
536, 545, 103 SCt 1344, 1350, 75 
LEd 2d 264 (1983) ("A 'political check' is 
provided when a state tax falls on a 
significant gioup of state citizens who can 
be counted upon to use their votes to keep 
the State fiom raising the tax excessively, 
and thus placing an unfair burden on the 
Federal Government It has been thought 
necessary because the United States does 
not have a direct voice in the state 
legislatures") 
x821 **1511 If Michigan were to tax the income of 
federal employees without imposing a like tax on 
others the tax would be plainly unconstitutional 
Cf McCulloch \ Man land 4 Wheat 316, 
425-437, 4 LEd 579 (1819) On the other hand, if 
the State taxes the income of all its residents 
equally, fedeial employees must pay the tax 
Gia\es \ New )oik e\ lei O'Keefe 306 U S 466, 
59 SCt 595, 83 LEd 927 (1939) See United 
States \ County of Fiesno 429 U S , at 468, 97 
SCt , at 707 (STEVENS, J, dissenting) The 
Michigan tax here applies to approximately 4 1/2 
million individual taxpayers in the State, including 
the 24,000 retired federal employees It exempts 
only the 130,000 retired state employees Tr of 
Oral Arg 35-36 Once one understands the 
underlying reason for the McCulloch holding, it is 
plain that this tax does not unconstitutionally 
discriminate against federal employees 
The Court reaches the opposite result only by 
examining whether the tax treatment of federal 
employees is equal to that of one discrete group of 
Michigan residents-retired state employees It 
states "It is undisputed that Michigan's tax system 
discriminates in favor of retired state employees and 
against retired federal employees " Ante at 1507 
But it does not necessarily follow that such a tax 
"discriminate[s] against the [federal] officer or 
employee because of the source of the pay or 
compensation" 4 U S C § 111 The fact that a 
State may elect to grant a pieference, or an 
exemption, to a small percentage of its residents 
does not make the tax discriminatory in any sense 
that is relevant to the doctrine of intergovernmental 
tax immunity The obligation of a fedeial judge to 
pay the same tax that is imposed on the *822 
income of similarly situated citizens in the State 
should not be affected by the fact that the State 
might choose to grant an exemption to a few of its 
taxpayers-whether they be state judges, other state 
employees, or perhaps a select group of private 
citizens Such an exemption might be granted "in 
spite of and not necessarily "because of its 
adverse effect on federal employees Cf Peisonnel 
Admimsti atoi of Massachusetts v Feeney 442 U S 
256, 279, 99 SCt 2282, 2296, 60 LEd 2d 870 
(1979) Indeed, at least 14 other States grant 
special tax exemptions for retirement income to 
state and local government employees that they do 
not grant to federal employees [FN3] As long as a 
**1512 state *823 income tax draws no distinction 
between the federal employees or retirees and the 
vast majority of voters in the State, I see no reason 
for concern about the kind of "discrimination" that 
these provisions make The intergovernmental 
immunity doctrine simply does not constitute a most 
favored nation provision requiring the States to 
accord federal employees and federal contractors 
the greatest tax benefits that they give any other 
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group subject to their jurisdiction. 
FN3. See Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 
43-1022(3) and (4) (Supp.1988) (benefits, 
annuities, and pensions received from the 
state retirement system, the state retirement 
plan, the judges' retirement fund, the 
public safety personnel retirement system, 
or a county or city retirement plan exempt 
in their entirety; income received from the 
United States civil service retirement 
system exempt only up to $2500); 
Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 39-22- 104(4)(f) and (g) 
(Supp.1988) (amounts received as 
pensions or annuities from any source 
exempt up to $20,000 but amounts 
received from Federal Government as 
retirement pay by retired member of 
Armed Forces less than 55 years of age 
exempt only up to $2000); Ga.Code Ann. § 
48-7-27(a)(4)(A) (Supp.1988) (income 
from employees' retirement system 
exempt); La.Rev.Stat. §§ 42:545, 47:44.1 
(West Supp.1989) (annuities, retirement 
allowances and benefits paid under the 
state employee retirement system exempt 
from state or municipal taxation in their 
entirety, but other annuities exempt only 
up to $6000); Md.Tax- Gen.Code Ann. § 
10-207(o ) (1988) (fire, rescue, or 
ambulance personnel length of service 
award funded by any county or municipal 
corporation of State exempt); 
Mo.Rev.Stat. § 169.587 (Supp.1989) 
(retirement allowance, benefit, funds, 
property, or rights under public school 
retirement system exempt); Mont.Code 
Ann. §§ 15-30-1 ll(2)(c)- (f) (1987) 
(benefits under teachers retirement law, 
public employees retirement system, and 
highway patrol law exempt in their 
entirety; benefits under Federal Employees 
Retirement Act exempt only up to $3600); 
N.Y.Tax Law § 612(c)(3) (McKinney 
1987) (pensions to officers and employees 
of State, its subdivisions and agencies 
exempt); N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 105-141(b)(13) 
and (14) (Supp.1988) (amounts received 
from retirement and pension funds 
established for firemen and law 
enforcement officers exempt in their 
entirety, but amounts received from 
federal-employee-retirement program 
exempt only up to $4000); Ore.Rev.Stat. §§ 
316.680(l)(c) and (d) (1987) (payments 
from Public Employees Retirement Fund 
exempt in their entirety, but payments 
under public retirement system established 
by United States exempt only up to 
$5000); S.C.Code §§ 12-7-435(a), (d), (e) 
(Supp.1988) (amounts received from state 
retirement systems and retirement pay 
received by police officers and firemen 
from municipal or county retirement plans 
exempt in their entirety; federal civil 
service retirement annuity exempt only up 
to $3000); Va.Code § 58.1-322(C)(3) 
(Supp.1988) (pensions or retirement 
income to officers or employees of 
Commonwealth, its subdivisions and 
agencies, or surviving spouses of such 
officers or employees paid by the 
Commonwealth or an agency or 
subdivision thereof exempt); W.Va.Code § 
§ ll-21-12(c)(5) and (6) (Supp.1988) 
(annuities, retirement allowances, returns 
of contributions or any other benefit 
received under the public employees 
retirement system, the department of 
public safety death, disability, and 
retirement fund, the state teachers' 
retirement system, pensions and annuities 
under any police or firemen's retirement 
system exempt); Wis.Stat. § 71.05(l)(a) 
(Supp.1988-1989) (payments received 
from the employees' retirement system of 
city of Milwaukee, Milwaukee city 
employees' retirement system, sheriffs 
retirement and benefit fund of Milwaukee, 
firefighters' annuity and benefit fund of 
Milwaukee, the public employee trust 
fund, and the state teachers' retirement 
system exempt). 
To be sure, there is discrimination against federal 
employees--and all other Michigan taxpayers—if a 
small group of residents is granted an exemption. 
If the size of the exempt group remains the 
same—say, no more than 10% of the populace—the 
burden on federal interests also remains the same, 
regardless of how the exempt class is defined. 
Whether it includes school teachers, church 
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employees, state judges, or peihaps handicapped 
peisons, is a matter of indifference to the Federal 
Government as long as it can fairly be said that *824 
federal employees are treated like other ordinary 
residents of the State 
Even if it were appropriate to determine the 
discriminatory nature of a tax system by comparing 
the treatment of federal employees with the 
treatment of another discrete group of persons, it is 
peculiarly inappropriate to focus solely on the 
treatment of state governmental employees The 
State may always compensate m pay or salary for 
what it assesses in taxes Thus a special tax 
imposed only on federal and state employees 
nonetheless may reflect the type of disparate 
treatment that the intergovernmental tax immunity 
foibids because of the ability of the State to adjust 
the compensation of its employees to avoid any 
special tax buiden on them United States v 
County ofFiesno 429 U S , at 468-469, 97 S Ct, at 
707-708 (STEVENS, J , dissenting) It trivializes 
the Supiemacy Clause to interpiet it as prohibiting 
the States from pioviding through this limited tax 
exemption what the State has an unquestionable 
right to provide through inci eased retnement 
benefits [FN4] 
FN4 The Court also suggests that 
compensating state employees through tax 
exemptions rather than through increased 
pension benefits disci lminates against 
federal taxpayers by reducing the pension 
income subject to federal taxation See 
ante at 1507, n 4 But letired state 
employees are not alone in receiving a 
subsidy through a tax exemption 
Michigan, like most States, provides tax 
exemptions to select industries and groups 
See, e g Mich Comp Laws Ann § 
205 54a(g) (West 1986 and Supp 1988) 
(industiial processing), and § 205 54a(p) 
(1986) (pollution control) That the State 
chooses to proceed by indirect subsidy 
rathei than direct subsidy, however, should 
not render the tax invalid under the 
Supremacy Clause 
Arguably, the Court's holding today is merely a 
logical extension of our decisions in Phillips 
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Chemical Co v Dumas Independent School Dist, 
361 US 376, 80 SCt 474, 4 L Ed 2d 384 (1960), 
and Memphis Bank & Tiust Co v Ganiei, 459 U S 
392, 103 SCt 692, 74 LEd2d 562 (1983) 
**1513 Even if it were, I would disagree with it 
Those cases are, however, significantly different 
*825 Phillips involved a tax that applied only to 
lessees of federal property Article 5248 of the 
Texas Code imposed a tax on lessees of federal 
lands measured by the value of the fee held by the 
United States Article 7173 of the Code, the only 
other provision that authorized a tax on lessees, 
either granted an exemption to lessees of other 
public lands or taxed them at a lower rate Lessees 
of privately owned property paid no tax at all [FN5] 
The company argued that "because Article 5248 
applies only to private users of federal property, it is 
invalid for that reason, without more " 361 U S , at 
382, 80 SCt , at 478 The Court rejected that 
argument, reasoning that it was "necessary to 
determine how other taxpayers similaily situated are 
treated" Id, at 383, 80 SCt , at 479 It then 
defined the relevant classes of "similarly situated" 
taxpayers as the federal lessees who were taxed 
under Article 5248 and the lessees of other public 
property taxed under Article 7173 Withm that 
narrow focus, the Court rejected the school district's 
argument that the discrimination between the two 
classes could be justified Because the Court 
confined its analysis to the two state taxes that 
applied to lessees of public property, its reasoning 
would be controlling in the case before us today if 
Michigan's income tax applied only to public 
employees, on that hypothesis, if state employees 
were exempted, the tax would obviously 
discriminate against federal employees 
FN5 "Although Article 7173 is, in terms, 
applicable to all lessees who hold 
tax-exempt property under a lease for a 
term of three years or more, it appears that 
only lessees of public property fall within 
this class in Texas Tax exemptions for 
real property owned by private 
organizations—chanties, churches, and 
similar entities-do not survive a lease to a 
business lessee The full value of the 
leased property becomes taxable to the 
owner, and the lessee's indirect burden 
consequently is as heavy as the burden 
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imposed directly on federal lessees by 
Article 5248." 361 U.S., at 380-381, 80 
S.Ct., at 477-478 (emphasis in original; 
footnote omitted). 
The troublesome aspect of the Court's opinion in 
Phillips is its failure to attach any significance to 
the fact that the tax on private landlords presumably 
imposed an indirect burden on *826 their lessees 
that was as heavy as the direct burden on federal 
lessees imposed by Article 5248. The Court did 
note that "[u]nder these circumstances, there 
appears to be no discrimination between the 
Government's lessees and lessees of private 
property." Id., at 381, 80 S.Ct., at 478. 
But-possibly because of the school district's rather 
unwise reliance on an equal protection analysis of 
the case [FN6]--the Court never even considered 
the question whether the political check provided by 
private property owners was sufficient to save that 
tax from the claim that it singled out federal lessees 
for an unconstitutional tax burden. [FN7] 
FN6. "The School District addresses this 
problem, essentially, as one of equal 
protection, and argues that we must uphold 
the classification, though apparently 
discriminatory, 'if any state of facts 
reasonably can be conceived that would 
sustain it.' Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 
U.S. 522, 528 [79 S.Ct. 437, 441, 3 
L.Ed.2d 480 (1959) ]." Id, 361 U.S., at 
383, 80 S.Ct., at 479. 
FN7. An interesting feature of the Phillips 
opinion is its reference to the fact that the 
tax upheld in United States v. City oj 
Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 78 S.Ct. 474, 2 
L.Ed.2d 424 (1958), had actually included 
an exemption for school-owned 
property-and therefore discriminated 
"against" federal property in the same way 
the tax involved in this case discriminates 
"against" federal employees. 
"This argument misconceives the scope of 
the Michigan decisions. In those cases we 
did not decide—in fact, we were not asked 
to decide-whether the exemption of 
school-owned property rendered the statute 
discriminatory. Neither the Government 
nor its lessees, to whom the statute was 
applicable, claimed discrimination of this 
character." Phillips Chemical Co. v. 
Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 
U.S., at 386, 80 S.Ct., at 480. 
The Court's description of the relevant 
class of property subject to tax in the 
Detroit case obviously would have 
provided the same political check against 
discrimination regardless of how the 
school property might have been 
classified. In Detroit, Justice Black 
described that class as follows: 
"But here the tax applies to every private 
party who uses exempt property in 
Michigan in connection with a business 
conducted for private gain. Under 
Michigan law this means persons who use 
property owned by the Federal 
Government, the State, its political 
subdivisions, churches, charitable 
organizations and a great host of other 
entities. The class defined is not an 
arbitrary or invidiously discriminatory 
one." 355 U.S., at 473, 78 S.Ct, at 478. 
**1514 In Memphis Bank & Trust Co., the 
question presented was the lawfulness of a 
Tennessee tax on the net earnings of *827 banks 
doing business in the State that defined net earnings 
to "include interest received by the bank on the 
obligations of the United States and its 
instrumentalities, as well as interest on bonds and 
other obligations of States other than Tennessee, but 
[to] exclude interest on obligations of Tennessee 
and its political subdivisions." 459 U.S., at 394, 
103 S.Ct, at 694. Although the federal obligations 
were part of a large class and the tax therefore did 
not discriminate only against the income derived 
from a federal source, all other members of the 
disfavored class were also unrepresented in the 
Tennessee Legislature. There was, therefore, no 
political check to protect the out-of- state issuers, 
including the federal instrumentalities, from 
precisely the same kind of discrimination involved 
in McCulloch v. Maryland. Indeed, in the 
McCulloch case itself, the taxing statute did not, in 
terms, single out the National Bank for disfavored 
treatment; the tax was imposed on "all Banks, or 
branches thereof, in the State of Maryland, not 
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chartered by the legislature:' 4 Wheat., at 317-318 
. A tax that discriminates against a class of 
nonresidents, including federal instrumentalities, 
clearly is not protected by the political check that 
saved the state taxes in cases like United States v. 
County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 97 S.Ct. 699, 50 
L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), and City of Detroit v. Murray 
Corp., 355 U.S. 489, 78 S.Ct. 458, 2 L.Ed.2d 441 
(1958). 
When the Court rejected the claim that a federal 
employee's income is immune from state taxation in 
Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 
59 S.Ct. 595, 83 L.Ed. 927 (1939), Justice 
Frankfurter wrote separately to explain how a 
"seductive cliche" had infected the doctrine of 
intergovernmental immunity, which had been 
"moving in the realm of what Lincoln called 
'pernicious abstractions.' " He correctly noted that 
only a "web of unreality" could explain how the 
"[f]ailure to exempt public functionaries from the 
universal duties of citizenship to pay for the costs of 
government was hypothetically transmuted into 
hostile action of one government against the other." 
Id, at 489-490, 59 S.Ct. at 603. 
*828 Today, it is not the great Chief Justice's 
dictum about how the power to tax includes the 
power to destroy that obscures the issue in a web of 
unreality; it is the virtually automatic rejection of 
anything that can be labeled "discriminatory." The 
question in this case deserves more careful 
consideration than is provided by the mere use of 
that label. It should be answered by considering 
whether the ratio decidendi of our holding in 
McCulloch v. Maryland is applicable to this quite 
different case. It is not. I, therefore, respectfully 
dissent. 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Wendell E. BRUMLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, 
Appellees, and Cross-Appellants, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, et al., 
Defendants, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee. 
No. 910242. 
Sept. 2, 1993. 
Opinion on Denial of Rehearing Jan. 13, 1994. 
Federal retirees brought declaratory judgment 
action against State Tax Commission seeking 
refund of state income taxes paid on federal 
retirement income. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, David S. Young, J., certified class, 
entered partial summary judgment ordering refund, 
and dismissed retirees' § 1983 claim. Commission 
appealed, and retirees cross- appealed. Granting 
interlocutory review, the Supreme Court, Howe, 
Associate C.J., held that: (1) class certified was not 
overly broad; (2) federal military retirees cannot be 
required to pay state income tax on federal 
retirement income; (3) retirees were not required to 
exhaust administrative remedies; (4) state officials 
were entitled to qualified immunity in § 1983 
action; (5) retirees were not entitled to attorney 
fees, costs of filing amended tax returns, or court 
costs; and, on rehearing, held: (6) state statute 
provided for refunds as remedy, and thus federal 
retirees could not be denied that remedy, even 
though it may not be required by federal due 
process; and (7) issue of interest was not raised on 
appeal, and thus, on rehearing, Supreme Court 
would not consider applicability of legislation 
limiting awards of interest which was enacted after 
issuance of first opinion. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Parties €^35.65 
2S7k35.65 Most Cited Cases 
Statute providing for refund of overpayment of 
income taxes upon filing of amended return or 
claim, in addition to statutory extension for filing 
for one of the disputed tax years, rather than statute 
providing method for paying taxes under protest, 
governed membership in class seeking refund for 
state income taxes paid on federal retirement 
income. U.C.A.1953, 59-1-301, 59-10-529. 
[2] Taxation €==>986.1 
371k986.1 Most Cited Cases 
Federal military retirees are entitled to receive state 
income tax exemption for their federal retirement 
income. 4 U.S.C.A. § 111. 
[3] Declaratory Judgment €=>214 
118Ak214 Most Cited Cases 
Federal retirees were not required to exhaust 
administrative remedies prior to bringing 
declaratory judgment action to determine their right 
to refund of state income taxes paid on federal 
retirement income; retirees raised legal questions 
which could not have been finally determined by 
Tax Commission in administrative proceeding, and 
Commission was left with duty to challenge, audit, 
and review amended returns and claims through its 
administrative process, such that district court had 
not interfered with core prerogatives of 
Commission. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-14(2)(b)(ii). 
[4] States €==>79 
360k79 Most Cited Cases 
State officials sued in their personal capacities may 
assert personal immunity defenses such as 
objectively reasonable reliance on existing law. 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
[5] Officers and Public Employees €^>H4 
283kl 14 Most Cited Cases 
Except under extraordinary circumstances, liability 
will not attach for executing statutory duties one has 
been appointed to perform. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
[6] Civil Rights €^>1376(2) 
78kl376(2) Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78k214(2)) 
Plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of 
constitutional or statutory right may overcome 
defendant officials' qualified immunity only by 
showing that those rights were clearly established at 
time of conduct at issue. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
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[7] Civil Rights €=^1376(3) 
78kl376(3) Most Cited Cases 
Agencies. 
(Formerly 78k214(3)) 
Commissioners and director of State Tax 
Commission were entitled to qualified immunity 
from federal retirees' § 1983 claim that officials 
failed to protect retirees' rights following United 
States Supreme Court decision prohibiting state 
taxation of federal retirement income; officials had 
no power or authority to repeal state tax on federal 
retirement income, and law regarding retroactivity 
of Supreme Court's decision was not clearly 
established at time of officials' actions. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1983. 
[8] Taxation €^>1097 
371kl097 Most Cited Cases 
Prevailing taxpayers in suit for refund of state 
income taxes were not entitled to award of attorney 
fees and reimbursement for any costs incurred in 
preparing and filing amended income tax returns, 
where their § 1983 action had been dismissed. 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
[9] Taxation €=1097 
371kl097 Most Cited Cases 
Prevailing taxpayers in suit for refund of state 
income taxes were not entitled to award of court 
costs, absent statute authorizing such award. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 54. 
110] Constitutional Law €=285.2 
92k285.2 Most Cited Cases 
[101 Taxation €=1102 
371kl 102 Most Cited Cases 
Even if federal due process did not require specific 
remedy for illegal exaction of state taxes from 
federal retirees, state statute provided for refunds as 
remedy, and thus federal retirees could not be 
denied that remedy. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; 
U.C.A. 1953,59-10-529. 
[11] Taxation €^>1097 
371kl097 Most Cited Cases 
On rehearing in Tax Commission's appeal in 
income tax refund case, Supreme Court would not 
consider applicability of legislation limiting awards 
of interest which was enacted after issuance of first 
opinion, where no issue was raised on appeal 
respecting award or rate of interest; however, 
inasmuch as order appealed from was interlocutory 
and case was being remanded to district court for 
further proceedings, Commission was free to 
present issue to that court for determination. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b). 
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Jack C. Helgesen, Richard W. Jones, Ogden, for 
Brumley. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Arty. Gen., Leon A. Dever, 
Brian L. Tarbet, John C. McCarrey, Asst. Attys. 
Gen., Salt Lake City, for Tax Com'n. 
Jan Graham, Arty. Gen., Carol Clawson, Sol. Gen., 
Reed Richards, Asst. Atty. Gen., for amicus 
Governor Michael O. Leavitt. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
We granted this interlocutory appeal to review (1) 
a partial summary judgment which ordered 
defendant Utah State Tax Commission to refund to 
all qualified persons and estates of deceased 
persons all Utah state income tax paid by them on 
retirement income from federal sources for the tax 
years of 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988, together with 
interest, court costs, and attorney fees, and (2) the 
dismissal of plaintiffs' civil rights action. 
On March 28, 1989, the United States Supreme 
Court in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 
489 U.S. 803, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 
(1989), held that the constitutional doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity embodied in 4 
U.S.C. § 111 required that the state of Michigan 
treat federal and state retirement income the same 
for state income tax purposes. Prior to that 
decision, Michigan, as well as many other states 
including Utah, allowed a tax exemption for state 
retirement income but not for federal retirement 
income. Shortly after that decision was announced, 
plaintiffs filed this action for a declaratory judgment 
in the district court against the State of Utah, the 
Tax Commission, its commissioners, and its 
director, seeking a refund of all taxes paid on 
retirement income received from federal sources for 
the tax years 1984 to and including 1988. On 
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plaintiffs' motion, the court entered an order 
certifying a class consisting of all federal retirees 
and estates of deceased persons who paid Utah 
State income tax on federal retirement income for 
those years. Plaintiffs estimate that the class 
consists of approximately 34,000 individuals and/or 
estates. *798 One of the Commission's principal 
defenses was that the decision in Davis should not 
be applied retroactively to any tax year prior to 
1989. Both plaintiffs and the Commission moved 
for summary judgment. The district court denied 
the Commission's motion and granted plaintiffs a 
partial summary judgment, ordering that the 
Commission refund state income tax paid by 
qualified plaintiffs on retirement income from 
federal sources for the years 1985 to 1988 inclusive. 
The Commission appeals. 
Subsequent to the briefing and oral argument of 
this appeal, the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in the case of Harper v. Virginia 
Department of Taxation, 242 Va. 322, 410 S.E.2d 
629 (1991), cert, granted, 504 U.S. 907, 112 S.Ct. 
1934, 118 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992), to determine 
whether its decision in Davis should be applied 
retroactively. Consequently, we have held the 
instant appeal under advisement pending the 
issuance of a decision in Harper. That decision 
was rendered on June 18, 1993, 509 U.S. 86, 113 
S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), the Court 
holding that its decision in Davis is to be applied 
retroactively. The Harper decision moots one of 
the Commission's principal defenses. However, 
other defenses to the issuance of refunds to 
plaintiffs have been raised, and we will proceed to 
examine them. 
OVERLY BROAD CLASS 
[1] The Commission contends that the class 
certified by the district court is overly broad. The 
Commission supports this contention by first 
arguing that the class should consist only of persons 
who paid their income taxes for the years in 
question under protest as provided for in Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-301 (1992) and brought suit for partial 
refunds of taxes paid under protest within six 
months thereafter as provided for in section 
78-12-31. There is no merit to this contention. 
Section 59-10-529, contained in our individual 
income tax act, provides for the refund of any 
"overpayment" of income taxes upon the filing of 
an amended return or claim within three years of the 
due date of the return. That section, rather than the 
general provisions for the payment of taxes under 
protest relied upon by Commission, is controlling 
here. 
The Utah Individual Income Tax Act of 1973, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 59-10-101 to -702 (1992), 
incorporates by reference federal income tax law 
and procedure into Utah income tax law. Section 
59-10-529 was patterned after federal tax law and 
provides for a refund of overpayments. The federal 
definition of the word "overpayment" was at issue 
in Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 68 
S.Ct. 229, 92 L.Ed. 142 (1947), when a taxpayer 
brought suit to recover a payment of income tax 
alleged to have been illegally assessed. The United 
States Supreme Court defined tax "overpayment" to 
include those tax payments made as a result of error 
in law. The court wrote: 
Hence we read the word "overpayment" in its 
usual sense, as meaning any payment in excess of 
that which is properly due. Such an excess 
payment may be traced to an error in mathematics 
or in judgment or in interpretation of facts or law. 
And the error may be committed by the taxpayer 
or by the revenue agents. Whatever the reason, 
the payment of more than is rightfully due is what 
characterizes an overpayment. 
Id. at 531, 68 S.Ct. at 233. Two defendant 
commissioners in their depositions concurred in that 
definition. Moreover, after the decision in Davis 
was announced, the legislature extended for an 
additional year (to April 16, 1990) the three-year 
limit for filing for refunds for the 1985 tax year. 
1990 Utah Laws ch. 21, §§ 1-3 (effective February 
21, 1990). Indeed, the Commission designed and 
circulated a special simplified claim form to be used 
by federal retirees to protect their rights in the event 
that it was eventually determined that Utah must 
refund taxes paid on their federal retirement income. 
[2] The Commission next contends that the class 
certified should not have included federal military 
retirees as distinguished from federal civilian 
retirees. The Commission argues that retired 
military personnel receive current compensation for 
reduced services rather than deferred compensation 
for past services as is the case with civilian retirees. 
Thus, the Commission asserts that *799 the Davis 
decision does not apply to retirement income 
received by military retirees since there is a 
significant difference in the nature of the retirement 
income received by the two types of retirees. 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
868 P 2d 796 
(Cite as: 868 P.2d 796) 
Page 4 
This contention was fully answered by the United 
States Supreme Court in its decision in Baikei v 
Kansas 503 US 594, 112 S Ct 1619, 118 LEd2d 
243 (1992), which was decided shortly after the 
briefing and oral argument in the instant case 
Baikei held that there are no significant differences 
between military retirees and state and local 
government retirees m terms of calculating 
retirement benefits and thus military retirees are 
entitled to the benefit of the Court's decision in 
Davis 
Finally, the Commission complains that the class 
certified is defective because it includes taxpayers 
who have claim:, for the 1984 tax year Plaintiffs 
ha\e conceded that those persons cannot prevail, 
and in the partial summary judgment, the 
Commission was not ordered to pay refunds for 
1984 but only for 1985 to 1988 inclusive On 
remand of this case to the district court, the class 
should be accordingly amended 
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES 
[3] The Commission contends that the district court 
erred in denying its motion to dismiss plaintiffs' 
complaint because plaintiffs had not exhausted their 
admmistiative rc-medies The court's denial was 
grounded on findings that (1) "requiring the 
plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies would 
result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion," 
Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-14(2)(b)(n) (1989), (2) 
there was no means to certify a class before the 
Commission and (3) the Commission had 
pieliminanly decided that Daws did not mandate 
refunds to plaintiffs We find no error Plaintiffs' 
demands upon the Commission raised several legal 
issues, namely, w hether the rule announced in Da\ is 
should be applied retroactively and whether 
plaintiffs weie required to have paid their taxes 
under piotest and to have brought their actions for 
refund within six months thereafter in the district 
couit These legal questions could not have been 
finally determined by the Commission in an 
administrative proceeding Therefore, it was 
appiopnate for plaintiffs to file their action for a 
declaratory judgment in the district court to obtain 
rulings on the legal questions IML Fi eight v 
Ottosen 538 P 2d 296 (Utah 1975), Walkei Bank 
& Tnist Co \ Fay hi 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P 2d 
592 (1964) See also Clayton \ Bennett 5 Utah 2d 
152, 298 P2d 531 (1956), and Crystal Cat Line v 
State Tax Commission 110 Utah 426, 174 P 2d 984 
(1946), for additional examples of declaratory 
judgment actions brought to determine legal 
questions arising out of administrative proceedings 
We recognize that in Johnson v Utah State 
Retuement Office 621 P 2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980) 
, we stated that the mere introduction of a 
constitutional issue does not obviate the need for 
exhaustion of administrative remedies The 
decision on other issues raised in the administrative 
proceeding might render the constitutional question 
moot, and thus the administrative remedy should be 
pursued That scenario was not a realistic 
possibility in the instant case The legal questions 
involved are threshold questions, and their 
determination could not have been avoided by any 
turn the case might have taken m the Commission 
Nor is this case like Union Pacific Raihoad v 
Stntctma! Steel & Foige Co 9 Utah 2d 318, 344 
P2d 157 (1959), where we stated that "m cases 
raising issues of fact not within the comentional 
experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise 
of administrative discretion, the agencies created by 
the legislative branch for regulating the subject 
matter should first be heard" Id at 320, 344 P 2d 
at 158 
The district court, after deciding the legal issues 
and concluding that refunds should be paid to class 
members, properly left to the Commission the 
responsibility of making the factual determinations 
as to whether each class member has timely filed an 
amended leturn or a claim and whether each 
member has paid state income tax on federal 
letirement income for the years in question This 
leaves the Commission with the duty to challenge, 
audit, and review amended returns and claims 
through its administrative process Thus, the 
district court has not interfered with the core 
prerogatives of the Commission 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION 
Plaintiffs cross-appeal, contending that the district 
court erred in dismissing their 42 U S C § 1983 
civil rights action In their *800 complaint, 
plaintiffs allege that their civil rights were violated 
between March 28, 1989, when Davis was decided, 
and April 17, 1989, which was the deadline for 
filing 1988 Utah individual income tax returns It 
is alleged that during this period, defendant 
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commissioners and director (1) failed to inform 
plaintiffs that no taxes would be due or collected on 
income they leceived from federal retirement 
sources during 1988, and (2) publicly announced 
that Davis had no application in Utah, that Utah's 
taxation scheme did not violate 4 U S C § 111, and 
that plaintiffs need not file a claim for refund for the 
1985 tax year by April 17, 1989 The district court 
dismissed the action on the ground that defendant 
officers enjoyed a qualified immunity 
Plaintiffs concede that the state is not a "person" 
under section 1983 and is not subject to a state 
court claim for damages m a section 1983 action 
Will v Michigan Dep't of State Police 491 U S 58, 
71, 109 SCt 2304, 2311, 105 LEd2d 45 (1989) 
Further, plaintiffs acknowledge that the Will court 
held that a suit against state officials m their official 
capacities is really a suit against the officials' offices 
and is no different from a suit against the state 
itself Howevei, plaintiffs argue that the state 
officials can be sued in their individual capacities 
and that under the circumstances presented by the 
instant case, the officials enjoy no qualified 
immunity 
[4][5][6] We will assume for the purposes of this 
case that 4 U S C § 111 confers on plaintiffs a right 
the violation of which would be actionable against 
the state officials in their individual capacities but 
for the imposition of qualified immunity But see 
Wiight v Roanoke Redev d. Housing 479 US 
418, 107 SCt 766, 93 LEd2d 781 (1987), 
Segundo \ City of Rancho Muage 813 F 2d 1387, 
1394 (9th Cn 1987) State officials sued in their 
personal capacities may asseit personal immunity 
defenses such as "objectively reasonable leliance on 
existing law" Hafei \ Melo 502 U S 21, — , 112 
SCt 358, 361, 116 L Ed 2d 301 (1991) (citing 
Kentucky \ Giaham 473 US 159, 105 SCt 3099, 
87 LEd2d 114 (1985)) Except under 
extraordinary encumstances, liability will not attach 
for executing the statutory duties one was appointed 
to perform Lemon v Kwtzman 411 U S 192, 
207-09, 93 SCt 1463, 1472-73, 36 L Ed 2d 151 
(1973) Howevei, a plaintiff who seeks damages 
for violation of a constitutional or statutory right 
may overcome the defendant officials' qualified 
immunity only by showing that those rights were 
clearly established at the time of the conduct at 
issue Hailow \ Fitzgeiald 457 U S 800, 818, 
102 S Ct 2727, 2738, 73 L Ed 2d 396 (1982) 
[7] Applying these principles to the instant case, 
plaintiffs complain that during the twenty-day 
period between the announcement of the decision in 
Davis and the April 17, 1989 deadline for filing 
Utah income tax returns for the 1988 tax year, 
defendant officials failed to protect plaintiffs' rights 
as earlier stated This contention, however, 
overlooks the fact that defendant officials had no 
power or authority to repeal Utah's tax on federal 
retirement income Only the legislature could do 
that The 1988 tax year concluded on December 
31, 1988, and by March 28, 1989, many taxpayers 
(including federal retirees) had already filed their 
returns and paid tax on their retirement income 
The legislature responded on September 19, 1989, 
by making state retirement income as well as federal 
letirement income taxable, effective January 1, 
1989 1989 Utah Laws ch 7, Second Special 
Session On February 21, 1990, the legislature 
extended the three-year limit for filing for refunds 
for the 1985 tax year for an additional year, to April 
16, 1990 1990 Utah Laws ch 21 These 
legislative responses were protective of plaintiffs' 
rights Moreover, during that twenty-day period, it 
was unclear whether Davis was to be applied 
retroactively so as to entitle federal retirees to 
refunds from the states where they had been taxed 
Davis did not mandate refunds, let alone decide 
whether refunds should be given for past years 
Indeed, it was not until Haipei v Vnginia was 
decided on June 18, 1993, that the retroactivity 
issue was finally resolved 
In Andeison v Oeighton 483 US 635, 107 SCt 
3034, 97 LEd2d 523 (1987), the Supreme Court 
clearly stated 
*801 The contours of the right [allegedly 
violated] must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he 
is doing violates that right This is not to say that 
an official action is protected by qualified 
immunity unless the very action in question has 
been previously held unlawful but it is to say 
that in the light of the pre-existing law the 
unlawfulness must be apparent 
Id at 640, 107 S Ct at 3039 Illustrative of this 
principle is Swanson v Poweis 937 F 2d 965 (4th 
Cir 1991), where the defendant, a former secretary 
of revenue for the state of North Carolina, was held 
to be entitled to qualified immunity for collecting 
state income tax from federal retirees on their 
retirement income prior to the announcement of the 
decision in Davis The court stated that only 
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violations of those federal rights clearly recognized 
in existing case law will support an award in 
damages under 42 U S C § 1983 The officials' 
conduct in this case does not meet this high test 
The perplexity of the problem facing the officials 
during the twenty-day period in attempting to 
determine whether the Davis decision should be 
applied retroactively is best demonstrated by the 
case of Duffy \ Wetzlei, 174 A D 2d 253, 579 
N Y S 2 d 684 (N Y App Div 1992) There, the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New 
York, after an exhaustive analysis of United States 
Supreme Court decisions on the subject of 
retroactivity, held on January 15, 1992, that the 
decision m Davis should not be applied 
retroactively so as to entitle federal retirees in New 
York State to a refund The Virginia Supreme 
Court reached a similar result in Haipei v Vugima, 
242 Va 322, 410 S E 2d 629 (1991) These cases, 
of course, reached the exact opposite conclusion on 
retroactivity than the United States Supreme Court 
leached in Haipei v Vugima more than one year 
later Because the constitutional rights in question 
were not "clearly established" during the twenty-day 
period, we find no error in the district court's 
dismissal of plaintiffs' ci\il rights action on the 
ground of qualified immunity 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
[8] The district court awarded plaintiffs attorney 
fees and leimbursement for any cost they may incur 
in piepanng and filing amended income tax returns 
Plaintiffs find support for those awards only in a 
successful 42 U S C § 1983 civil rights action 
Inasmuch as we have held that their civil rights 
action was propeily dismissed, the award of 
attorney fees and the cost of return preparation 
cannot stand That part of the summary judgment 
is reveised 
[9] Neither can the award of court costs to 
plaintiffs stand Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, states in part, "Costs against the state of 
Utah, its officeis, and agencies shall be imposed 
only to the extent permitted by law" Plaintiffs 
ha\e cited no statute which would authorize the 
award of costs in this case 
CONCLUSION 
We ha\e considered othei assignments of en or 
made by defendants and find them lacking in merit 
The partial summary judgment is affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the 
district court for further pioceedings consistent with 
this opinion 
HALL, C J , ZIMMERMAN, J , and BILLINGS, 
Court of Appeals J , concur 
STEWART, J , having disqualified himself, does 
not participate herein 
BILLINGS, Court of Appeals J , sat 
DURHAM, J, having disqualified herself, does not 
participate herein 
On Petition for Rehearing 
HOWE, Justice 
The Utah State Tax Commission filed a petition for 
rehearing in this case, Bi umley v State Tax Comm 'n, 
868 P2d 796 (Utah 1993), and the Honorable 
Michael O Leavitt, Governor of Utah, has filed an 
amicus curiae brief in support of that petition The 
petition raises three questions which we address 
[10] First, petitioner assails our failure m our 
opinion to address petitioner's contention that state 
law satisfied all federal due process requirements by 
providing federal retirees, *802 prior to their 
payment of any taxes for the years in question, the 
opportunity to challenge the legality of the 
exemption for state retirees We did not address 
that contention because even if it is true, it is not 
dispositive The legislature in Utah Code Ann § 
59-10-529 granted direct relief to taxpayers who 
overpay by providing for refunds of overpayments 
It is true that Haipei v Vugima Depaitment oj 
Taxation, 509 U S 86, — , 113 S Ct 2510, 2520, 
125 LEd2d 74, 89 (1993), gave the states latitude 
to craft a remedy for the illegal exaction of taxes 
In Utah, however, the nature of the remedy was not 
an open question The legislature had long since 
provided refunds as the remedy Plaintiffs cannot be 
denied that remedy even though it may not be 
required by federal due process Cases cited by 
petitioner and amicus where refunds were not 
required as a matter of state law are therefore 
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distinguishable. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of 
Taxation, 241 Va. 232, 401 S.E.2d 868, 873 (1991) 
; Reich v. Collins, 262 Ga. 625, 422 S.E.2d 846, 
849 (1992), on remand from U.S. Sup.Ct., 263 Ga. 
602, 437 S.E.2d 320 (1993). 
Second, petitioner requests that we clarify an 
ambiguity in our opinion wherein we stated; 
The district court ... properly left to the 
Commission the responsibility of making the 
factual determinations as to whether each class 
member has timely filed an amended return or a 
claim.... 
Brumley, 868 P.2d at 799. That statement is in 
error. The Tax Commission admitted in its answer 
to the complaint that the class members had timely 
filed. The trial court ordered refunds to be paid to 
all members of the class. No challenge was raised 
on appeal to any lack of filing or the timeliness of 
filing. Therefore, we amend our opinion by 
striking the statement that the Commission should 
determine whether each class member timely filed 
an amended return oi a claim 
- IL di ^:i K* ct'Uil i--* J- i<:d iclund> 
together with interest thereon at the rate of "12 
percent per annum in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-10-538, 1987 as amended," No issue 
was raised on appeal respecting the award or the 
rate of interest. After our opinion was handed 
down, the legislature, in special session, enacted a 
statute which petitioner argues limits the award of 
interest to 6 percent per annum. H.B. 7, 2d Spec. 
Sess. (1993). 
In accordance with our long-standing practice of 
refusing to consider issues raised for the first time 
on rehearing, we decline to decide whether this new 
legislation can be lawfully applied in the instant 
case. However, inasmuch as the order appealed 
from is interlocutory and the case is being remanded 
to the district court for further proceedings, 
petitioner is free to present this issue to that court 
nv- its determination Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b). This 
' *.- tion comports with our limited function as an 
..•[•. Hate court to review orders and judgments 
made b\ the liia! conn- in the fust insi.nu :. 
• . i \u-- tor ichearing is denied, and the 
opimoi is amended as indicated abo\e 
ZIMMER M VN, C.J I I s I I J , i in. I J I JDITH M. 
BILI INGS, Court of Appeals Judge, concur. 
STEWART, Associate C.J., having disqualified 
himself, does not participate herein; Bfl.! IV :vv 
Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
DURHAM. J... h a \ i n g cl i s qu a 1 i fi e d h e r s e 1 f , d o e s n o t 
participate herein. 
i ^ : p ' i i - l e t i i e T ^ i . 
868 P.2d 796 
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Case No. 010911230 
Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
I h i s ma 11 e r c ame be f o re 11 i« E • C Di i r !:  f o r o ra 1 a rgument on 
August 20, 2002, pursuant to 11 ie Motion to Dismiss of the Utab 
S t a t e T a x C o mm i s s i o n D e f e n d a i I t s 01 i A i i :j i s 1: 2 3 2 0 0 2 11 i e C • : • I i j : c: 
entered an Order joining the State Retirement Board. Subsequent 
to that. order, P] a :i n 1: :i ffs , T a: c C< : >mmi ss:i ( :)i I D e f e n d a n t s ai id 11 I 2 
State Retirement Board agreed on. a schedule and filed memoranda 
to supplement the Mot i < :)r I I : D:i sin i ss t h a t w a s h e a r i c i I / . : . * 
2002. Plaintiffs were represented by Gary Dodge, Kevin W. Bates, 
and Mark R. Clements of the law firm of Hatch, James and Dodge. 
The Tax Commission was represented by John C. McCarrey and 
Timothy A. Bodily, Assistant Attorneys General. The Utah State 
Retirement Board was represented by Kevin A. Howard, Gregory D. 
Phillips, Daniel D. Andersen, and David B. Hansen of the lav; firm 
Howard, Phillips and Andersen. 
The State Retirement Board joined in the pending Motion to 
Dismiss. After reviewing the supplemental pleadings, the Court 
concluded that the oral argument held on August 20, 2002, was 
sufficient and that further oral argument would not aid the Court 
in its decision. 
Having reviewed the pleadings of the parties submitted prior 
to the hearing, and having reviewed the subsequent pleadings 
filed by Plaintiffs, the Tax Commission Defendants, and the Utah 
State Retirement Board, this case is dismissed pursuant to Rule 
12(B)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons 
stated below, I grant Defendants' motion. 
On September 19, 1989, the Utah legislature made state 
retirement income as well as federal retirement income taxable, 
while at the same time increasing pension benefits to state 
2 
retirees by 3 i ill J h > >. > l<i ..mi. , -I1.' 1 1 i 1'' .-^  i . I lamtii i"s, 
retirees who were employed by the federal government,, cha] lerige 
11 i e s t a t e' s :i e c i s i o i i 1: • : • i i i c r e a s e p e i i s i o i I b e i I e f i t s t o s t a t e 
retirees, claiming that the benefits are merely a replacement; for 
t: h e J : s t: t a x e x enip t i o i i a i i d e s s e r I t i a 1J \, c c i I s t :i t I 11 e t a x r e b a t e s I. o 
State retirees. 
A f u 3 1 i 11 I d e r s t a n ci i i i g c: • f 11 I e n a 11 i r e • : f P1 a i n t i f f s' :: ] a i n i s 
requires an 1: listorical explanation. Prior to 1989; 21 states 
exempted recipients of state reti remei I 1: bei ief:i t: s frc -i : i :i i icome tax 
while imposing income tax on tt le benefits of federal retirees. 
In 1989; the Unites State Supreme Court ended thj s practi ce, 
finoing that i t constituted unlawful tax discriminatior I ir I 
violation of federal lav/ and the doctrine of intergovernmental 
tax immunity. Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989). 
Utah, 11ke many sister states , responded to the Supreme 
C • : • i :i i !:.' s e d i c t b y a i i: le i i d i n g i t s s t a t u t e t o ma ke state retirement 
benefits taxable. The legislature also increased pension 
b e n e f :i i s t : ; 31 : a t e r e t i r e e s b y 3 1 I J t c 11 C : : 1 :: i :i 
(1998). It is undisputed that the increase in retirement 
fc > e 1 1 e f :i t s 1 a r g e J y o f f s e t s 11: 1 = a 1 1 :) 1 
individual Utah retiree would be required to pay. 
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Plaintiffs contend that Utah's response to the mandate of 
Davis was nothing more than a sham that merely perpetuated the 
unlawful discrimination which existed pre-Davis where federal 
retirees pay full state income tax on their benefits while state 
retirees pay less than full state income tax on their benefits 
because of the rebate. 
I have reviewed the reported cases addressing similar 
challenges to legislative responses to Davis. See, Sheehv v. 
Association of Montana Retired Public Employees, 864 P.2d 786 
(Mont. 1993), Raasdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348 
(Or. 1995), Voal v. Department of Revenue, 960 P.2d 373 (Or. 
1997), Almeter v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 53 Va. Cir.. 
429 (2000) cert denied, 122 S.Ct. 202 (Mem.) (2001) . Irrespective 
of outcome, these cases recognize that the Davis Court did not 
foreclose, and in fact anticipated, a state's ability to respond 
to the Court's holding by increasing benefits to its retirees. 
Those cases which invalidated, as violative of Davis, increases 
in state retiree benefits, did so only because the benefit 
increases incorporated additional provisions which made 
transparent the true and improper nature of the response— 
creating a tax rebate. 
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SpeciixCa1 I 11 bn-ehy tl Montana Supreme Court concluded 
that Montana's response to Davis /as actual!/ a discriminatory 
[til 1 i t i t iproper / lavored state retirees li jnq 
i iljntana based ^olel^ on the source if ty ^ir retirement 
n Llx ' ! L Ji ti r e idence c h a 
ta\ rebate v ds tb c fa~t that Mor "ana's f u n l m g for the adiustnen^ 
) i i y [ pi i I 1 r t 1 i iir d I i 1 i 1 u L I 
L V in estment inccnip pi duced tv ae retirement tund itself. I i 
3 ] n 1 h ^  rr r *- 1 t [ t 
statutoi ^i^rease to f e Public Employees Retirement System 
("PEKS") oenefits to c ^ ^ n r i i \ 
taxation of tne PFPS demerits &^ > in \ olation of Davis. ogl, 
960 2d J ^ (199/) 1 ^ Vool c _ r t ultxn t i n 1 i i h t 
^he ncrease in PEPS oenefits \ as a ta/ retake o^caase tn. 
relationship between th~ lost e'-notion and the 1995 in i^ i 
it i purported legal equivaierc. Id at 381. 
Upon consideration of the-^ rase 1 conclude that Utah's 
tdtu iv e i i L ^  /ib i^ ui Ldintt tl by any of tht above 
ment onea provisions li i whuch ne crulci reasonably conclude 
t I at I ^ n^ t i t it e. 
t \ iid be disingenuous 1o^ me to suggest that the timing 
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and content of the amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-701 
(1998), did not reflect our legislature's desire to accomplish by 
lawful means the result which the Davis Court found to be 
impermissibly discriminatory. The timing and intent of the 
legislature's response to Davis is not, however, controlling. Of 
primary importance is the plain language of the statutory product 
of the legislature's response to Davis. The statute itself 
applies to all members whose retirement allowance was previously 
exempt from tax, pre-Davis, but whose allowance has "subsequently 
become subject to the tax.'' Specifically, a member shall 
receive: 
(a) rhe administrator shall calculate the member's 
retirement allowance pursuant to the formula 
governing the system from which the member 
retired; 
(b) the administrator shall then increase the 
allowance calculated under Subsection (2)(a) by 
3%; and 
(c) the adjusted retirement allowance under Subsection 
(2) (b) is the new basis upon which any future 
adjustments to benefits are made. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-701 (2002)1. 
Additionally, under subsection (6) 
(a) [t]he retirement board shall annually certify the 
1
 The 2002 amendment, effective March 27, 2002, renumbered 
this section, formerly referred to as Section 49-1-701. 
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contribution rate necessary for each system to 
comply with this section and may adopt rules to 
a dm. i n i s t e r t h i s sec t i o n . 
(>>) [t]his contribution rate shall be reported 
separately from the total contribution rate 
necessary to fund the systems on an actuarially 
sound basis and may not be used in comparative 
studies of public employee benefits. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-701 (2002). 
l
 * c J o s e J o :> 1 : a t t: i :t e s e s t a 11 11 o r y p r o z i s i o n s indicates 11 I a t 
the language betrays no discriminatory content. First, the 3% 
adjustment i s g i ~ 7 e i I t :> a ! ] r: e t: i r e e s w 1 I c • w a r e i :  ienib e i s o f z h e 
system. There is no distinction between retirees located j n the 
s t a t e o f [ 11 a h a n d 11 I :> S e ! o c a t e d • : i 11 o f s 1: a t e . E s s e i 11 i a 11 y , e " e r y 
eligible retiree who retired on or after January 1, 1989, 
received the 3^ inc^p-^- MI -m I'ccle ^nn r >]-^- 1 ~ < n [ i i i 
(1998). Second, the statute itself evidences no attempt to 
coordinate the 3% benefit with the i ncome tax rates or szri ic11 Ire 
as found under Utah Code Ann.,. Title 59. Finally, distinguishing 
itself from Sheehv, the plain language shows that the legislature 
does ,iv! the i-s adjustment via direct legislative 
appropriation of tax dollars to eligible retirees. Utah Code 
I i 11 ] § 1 9 ] ; 0 ] (• 5; ; ] $ • 9 8 ) I J11 i m a t e 1 ;y , 11: 1 e total cost, i s 
recognized as a direct part of the total employees' compensation 
package. 
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This statutory analysis, coupled with the Davis Court's 
clear anticipation of the Utah legislature's response, through 
its holding, warrants the conclusion that Plaintiffs' claims must 
fail as a matter of law, and Defendants' motion is hereby 
granted. 
In view of the foregoing, I need not reach the other 
arguments advanced by Defendants in aid of their motion. 
Hatch, James & Dodge 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Howard, Philrips & Andersen 
Attorneys for Utah State Retirement 
Board 
8 
«* 
CERTIFICATE OE ' SERV ICE 
I hereby certify that on the , ^ day of 
2003, I caused a copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMXSSA" 
mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Gary Dodge 
Kevin W. Bates 
Mark R. Clements 
Hatch James & Dodge 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4101 
John C. McCarrey 
Timothy A. Bodily 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
PO Box 140874 
Salt lake City, Utah 84114-0874 
Kevin A. Howard 
Howard Phillips & Andersen 
Attorney for Defendant Utah State Retirement Board 
560 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 481 02 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the I day of May, 2003, I 
caused a copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL to be hand 
delivered to: 
Gary Dodge 
Kevin W. Bates 
Mark R. Clements 
Hatcn James & Dodge 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Kevin A. howard 
Howard Phillips & Andersen 
Attorney for Defendant Utah State Pemrement Board 
560 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 48102 
<c TAftAi Sti.nsLlM~ 
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